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 Preface 
 
 
Norges Bank Watch has gained prominence in the public debate about monetary policy in 
Norway. The yearly reports of Norges Bank Watch provide an external evaluation of the 
monetary policy decisions of Norges Bank in the preceding year. In addition, each Report 
addresses some specific issues that are pertinent to the Norwegian monetary policy framework. 
The continued ability of monetary policy to provoke controversies underscores the importance of 
preserving the annual tradition of independent reviews by Norges Bank Watch. 
 
We hope that Norges Bank Watch 2005 fulfils its aim of contributing to improvements to 
monetary policy in Norway. 
 
 
 
Oslo, 5 April 2005 
Norges Bank Watch 2005 
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Executive summary 
 
 
Monetary policy in Norway is quite successful. The series of cuts in the signalling rate 
starting in December 2002, and a low interest rate during 2004, seems the appropriate 
policy choice.  The analyses on monetary policy done in the Bank document a highly 
competent staff. Communication with the market is good and steadily improving. Not 
surprisingly, there is still room for improvement in the conduct of monetary policy in 
Norway. Those areas should receive particular attention in a Report like this one. In our 
best judgment, Norges Bank is overall doing a very good job, however. 
 
 
The policy mandate and the exchange rate 
 
A repeated issue in the discussion of Norwegian monetary policy is to what extent 
Norges Bank cares about exchange rate stability, and to what extent the policy mandate 
says that it should care about it. In our view there are indications that Norges Bank 
interprets the policy mandate in a narrow way, by downplaying the statement in the 
mandate that monetary policy also should contribute to exchange rate stabilization. We 
find the existing policy mandate appropriate. In some situations a clause about exchange 
rate stability in the mandate, and Norges Bank reminding the market about it, may affect 
market participants’ expectations, thus contributing to exchange rate stability. As a matter 
of principle, the statement of the objectives for the monetary policy given in policy 
documents such as the Inflation Report should be complete, not excluding the part about 
exchange rate stability.  
 
 
Central Bank independence 
 
The procedure of having the Governor submit his suggested proposals to the Board, the 
day before Board meetings, to the Ministry of Finance, does not limit the policy options 
considered by the Board. However, it may limit the influence of the outside directors. 
More resources committed to the Board should be considered like providing outside 
Board members with research assistants within the Bank. Also, time and money devoted 
for the outside Board members to be working on monetary policy could be enlarged. The 
Government’s right to instruct Norges Bank does not limit the Bank in its execution of 
monetary policy. This option acts as an escape valve and as a means for rapid decision 
making. We see no reason for scrapping it.  
 
 
A narrow theoretical framework 
 
Given the large deviation from the 2.5 percent inflation target, a direct evaluation 
according to a standard loss function for a central bank only caring about inflation and 
output variability, would presumably indicate that monetary policy is highly 
unsuccessful. Yet there is currently almost no criticism of monetary policy in Norway. 
Observers, be it politicians, social partners, market participants - with few exceptions - do 
not consider the very low rate of inflation an important problem, as long as the real 
economy is doing well. On the other hand, many of the same observers are really 
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concerned about the future development of variables that monetary policy, narrowly 
conceived, should not care about. This discrepancy suggests that either the theoretical 
framework is too narrow, or that most observers do not really understand what is going 
on. The former, we believe, is the case. 
 
Norges Bank’s policy documents reflect the work of a highly competent staff. Norges 
Bank follows the current thinking and progress around inflation targeting. However, as 
the main approach to monetary policy is methodologically rather narrow, it is important 
that Norges Bank is open also to other parts of the economic literature, and to other 
perspectives on monetary policy. The Bank’s regional network is one example of such 
openness. 
 
 
What should a central bank care about? 
 
Under a flexible inflation target, the central bank cares about low and stable inflation, as 
well as output stability. When inflation variability is a sign of instability in the real 
economy, addressing this instability usually also involves an appropriate policy for the 
real economy. However, when inflation variability is caused by other factors, such as 
exogenous supply shocks, inflation variability does not imply similar costs to society. In 
contrast, there is reason to believe that variability in other variables, which inflation 
targeting central banks usually do not care directly about, do entail real costs.  
 
Large fluctuations in the real exchange rate may involve considerable costs for the 
economy. Under flexible inflation targeting, the interest rate is not pinned down exactly 
by the inflation target. In situations where the exchange rate is viewed as very weak or 
very strong, one may allow a longer horizon for reaching the inflation target, thus 
providing room to take the effect of interest rate changes on the exchange rate into 
consideration. 
 
The interest rate is primarily an instrument to ensure low and stable inflation, as well as a 
stable real economy. When the economy is changing, the interest rate must also change. 
However, large changes in interest rates increase the risk that some households and 
enterprises make financial decisions based on incorrect expectations. A concern for the 
negative consequences of large changes in the interest rate suggests that the central bank 
should try to avoid setting very low or very high interest rates, as long as this is consistent 
with the inflation and output objectives. 
 
 
Monetary policy under low inflation 
 
Low inflation and negative output gap in Norway over the last two years have called for a 
low interest rate to stimulate the economy, reducing unemployment and pushing inflation 
up towards the 2.5 percent target. To reduce the risk of excessively stimulating the 
economy, the Bank should not set a too low interest rate. By extending the horizon for 
achieving the 2.5 percent inflation target to 3 years, the Bank does take the cautious 
approach as advocated here. The current low rate of inflation does not imply that the 
inflation target should be reduced. The appropriate response to positive supply shocks is 
to stretch the horizon for reaching the inflation target, ensuring that monetary policy 
contributes to a stable evolution of the real economy.  
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The new macroeconomic model NEMO 
 
The new calibrated macroeconomic model NEMO is likely to prove useful to the Bank. 
However, a model of this type may downplay the risks and uncertainties associated with 
monetary policy. Thus, it is crucial that the Bank supplements the analyses done in 
NEMO with other types of analyses and information, when policy decisions are made.  It 
is our understanding that Norges Bank is aware of the importance of supplementing 
NEMO with other types of information and analyses, in accordance with this view. 
 
 
Too tight monetary policy in 2002 and into 2003…. 
 
Monetary policy operates with long time-lags. Thus, the effects of monetary policy 
decisions taken in 2001-03 are still being felt in 2004-05. Likewise, decisions taken in 
2004 must be judged in light of how the economy performs in 2005 and 2006.  
 
In 2003 and 2004, inflation was far below the 2.5% target, and the output gap was 
negative. This is strong evidence that monetary policy, viewed with the benefit of 
hindsight, was too tight in 2002 and early 2003, and possibly also in 2001. The tight 
monetary policy and strong krone at the time contributed to Norwegian firms increasingly 
expanding abroad. However, when Norges Bank started to act, the series of cuts in the 
interest rate since December 2002 seems an appropriate response to the situation.  
 
To some extent, the too tight monetary policy reflected that throughout 2002 and 2003, 
Norges Bank’s wage forecasts for 2004 were consistently higher than the actual outcome, 
leading to too high inflation estimates. Other forecasters expected lower wage growth. 
When such large discrepancies occur, the Bank should work out alternative strategies 
based upon various likely assumptions, thus being able to react quickly when one of the 
alternatives plays itself out. 
 
However, the setting of interest rates must also be seen in the light of the wage formation 
process. By raising interest rates after the 2002 wage negotiations Norges Bank 
demonstrated the consequences of too high wage growth with an inflation target. This 
interest rate hike and the subsequent weakening of labour market conditions contributed 
to the observed wage moderation in 2003 and 2004. 
 
 
…. calling for decisive actions through 2003 and loose monetary policy 
in 2004 
 
On the quality of the decisions taken in 2004 and into 2005, the jury is still out. Was the 
final bout of rate cuts, from 2½% in October 2003 to 1¾% in March 2004 necessary? On 
the one hand, they took place when the domestic economy already had turned the corner, 
confirmed by increasing demand, production and employment. On the other, core 
inflation continued to surprise on the downside, hitting a low of –0.1% in January 2004, 
strongly suggesting a low interest rate.  
 
In July 2004 the two-year horizon was abandoned in favour of a more flexible horizon of 
1-3 years. Such a step had been recommended by many, e.g. NBW-04. Given the low 
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prevailing rate of inflation, maintaining the two-year horizon would mean that rates 
would have to be cut even further, increasing the likelihood of real economy instability.  
 
NBW approves of the decision to stretch the horizon to 1-3 years. A longer time horizon 
gives the Bank more flexibility when responding to shock, implying that stability of the 
economy can be given more weight. As the rationale for stretching out the horizon is both 
reasonable and clearly spelled out, the credibility of the inflation target should not be put 
in jeopardy. 
 
 
The present challenge is to avoid stimulating the economy excessively 
 
Current monetary policy is expansionary, with the folio rate at its lowest level since 1816, 
and the real rate 1½-2½ percentage points below its assumed neutral level. The output 
gap is currently close to zero, and is expected to be positive for the next four years. In 
such a situation, monetary policy must avoid an excessive stimulation of the economy.  
Too strong growth entails a risk for a renewed period with a too high interest rate, an 
appreciating krone and loss of competitiveness for Norwegian enterprises. The time is 
ripe for gradually abandoning the current expansionary monetary policy. It is therefore 
comforting that Norges Bank’s Board in its latest strategy document (enclosed in IR 1/05) 
is signalling that rates will be raised towards normal levels over the next four-year period.  
The rate should be hiked in a measured way, to await market reactions. Relevant and 
persuasive communication should be part of the action, reducing the risk of a currency 
appreciation. 
 
 
The importance of forecasting must not be undervalued 
 
Since changes in the interest rate affect the economy with a lag of 2-3 years, forecasting 
economic developments over the short- to mid-term is a necessary element in the conduct 
of monetary policy. The forecasting errors, in particular for the rate of inflation, have 
been large. Also, Norges Bank’s fan charts seem to underestimate the real uncertainty 
associated with the inflation forecasts. To what extent forecast errors could have been 
smaller by employing other methods, one cannot know. A proper evaluation and 
comparison of the various forecasts and reasons for their large deviations from the later 
observed values of the relevant variables would be useful, both when it comes to 
improving the forecasts, and when assessing the uncertainty associated with the forecasts.  
 
The large forecast errors illustrate the need for at least two forecasters with sufficient 
resources. It is therefore important that Statistics Norway allocates enough resources to  
forecasting and analyses of the development of the Norwegian economy. 
 
 
Norges Bank is overall a transparent communicator…. 
 
A central aspect of inflation targeting is to communicate the central bank's objectives and 
plans and likely response function. Norges Bank is doing a good job in informing the 
market and the public at large. Communication has been continuously improved over the 
years. The Inflation Report, in particular, contains much information that helps to 
enlighten the markets' understanding of the conduct of monetary policy. Analyses in the 
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Inflation Report are driven by a commitment to seek a better understanding of the forces 
shaping economic activity and inflation going forward. The decision to publish the 
Board's strategy Report for the forthcoming strategy period in the Inflation Report, has 
further improved communication. 
 
Norges Bank has taken an active approach in communicating with the academic 
community and with the public at large. It is very valuable that researchers in the Bank 
take part in the scientific debates with fellow researchers outside the Bank. 
 
Norges Bank is doing a good job in communicating the objectives and plans of monetary 
policy with the social partners. The hearings in the Storting meet the expectations of the 
politicians.  
 
In regard to the stretching of the horizon to 1-3 years in July 2004, there is, however, a 
notable discrepancy between Norges Bank and external observers. The Bank does not 
consider the change as important, while external observers generally do. When policy 
formulations are changed significantly, while the Bank maintains that the policy is the 
same, private agents may be uncertain how the new formulations should be interpreted. 
This may reduce transparency and predictability of the monetary policy.  
 
 
If monetary policy is fully transparent, market reactions to actual interest rate changes 
should be small, as the market would respond continuously to new information becoming 
available. Such a pattern does not emerge. After four years of inflation targeting Norges 
Bank continues to surprise. However, surprises are few and generally of a minor nature. It 
is difficult to see that they represent a large problem, or reflect a substantial lack of 
transparency. 
 
 
… but significant policy shifts should be announced at press conferences 
rather than at speeches 
 
The two most important shifts in monetary policy in the last three years were announced 
in speeches and not after ordinary Board meetings.  A speech on another subject does not 
allow for a proper explanation of changes in the policy stance. The fact that important 
changes were announced in a speech also raises the question of whether the Board 
actually was involved in the decisions. In our view the Board should be involved on 
occasions where the Bank actually changes its strategy. An extraordinary meeting should 
be held. The decision to take larger steps could have been communicated at a press 
conference, preceded by a press statement explaining that the former strategy no longer 
was valid, with the reasons for this change being given. 
 
 
The optimal path for the rate of interest 
 
During 2004, and also in IR 1/05, Norges Bank took further steps towards applying an 
optimal interest rate path, as NBW-04 recommended. We approve of this practice, not 
least because it implies that the forecasts will be unbiased. This has not always been the 
case in the past. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Formally, Norges Bank has been practicing inflation targeting for four years (since March 
2001). However, already in January 1999 a reorientation of monetary policy took place as 
it was explicitly stated by Norges Bank that an inflation rate of two per cent was a 
necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) condition to stabilize the krone against the euro. 
 
Although Norges Bank is a latecomer to the group of inflation targeting central banks, it 
has learned fast and is steadily moving forward. Today Norges Bank is on the best 
practice frontier on monetary policy on a number of dimensions. Kuttner (2004, p. 21) 
maintains that “Norges Bank’s directness on the issue of flexibility is exceptional.” He 
goes on to argue (p. 22) that by conveying a great deal of flexibility Norges Bank 
“contradicts the view that a trade-off exists between transparency and flexibility.” 
 
Svensson (2004, p. 163) labels Norges Bank “an enthusiastic newcomer to the inflation-
targeting camp that has moved straight into the group of best-practice inflation targeters.” 
The Bank’s practice of plotting the inflation forecast and the output-gap in the same 
graph, is an innovation, Svensson says, adding that the graph “clearly serves to 
emphasize that the Bank is concerned with the stability of the real economy as well as 
with inflation, emphasizing the flexibility in its inflation targeting.” 
  
The Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at BI Norwegian School of Management has 
organized Norges Bank Watch since 2000 by every year inviting a group of experts to 
write a Report on the conduct of monetary policy in Norway. This is the sixth Norges 
Bank Watch Report. Its mandate reads as follows: 
 
The objective of the Norges Bank Watch Report of 2005 is to evaluate Norges 
Bank's conduct of monetary policy, given the mandate for the monetary policy set 
by the Government in March 2001. The committee should evaluate if the 
objectives stated in the monetary policy mandate concur with those expressed by 
Norges Bank and whether Norges Bank uses its policy instruments efficiently in 
order to achieve the relevant objectives.  
 
The committee should also address other issues that it may find relevant for the 
present conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Finally, the committee should evaluate the communication strategy of Norges 
Bank.  
 
The Report shall be presented at a press conference no later than 1 June 2005. 
 
Starting last year Norges Bank Watch receives financial support from the Ministry of 
Finance. However, Norges Bank Watch 2005 is fully independent. The views and 
recommendations in this Report may not correspond to those of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
In line with the mandate, we review Norges Bank’s interpretation of the monetary policy 
mandate in Chapter 2. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical framework for 
inflation targeting which is then applied to the Norwegian case in Chapter 3. Norges 
Bank’s forecasts and interest rate decisions in 2003 and 2004 are assessed in Chapter 4. 
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Finally, in Chapter 5 Norges Bank’s communication in general and with the financial 
community in particular, is looked more closely into. 
 
A summary in Norwegian is provided at the very end of this Report. 
 
Communication is a two-way street. What messages are communicated? How are the 
messages perceived or understood? In preparing this Report we have met with people on 
the receiving side, i.e. politicians in the Finance Committee in the Storting, 
representatives from the social partners, people working in financial markets, as well as 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and in Norges Bank. Also, it has been our good 
fortune to discuss monetary policy with the Governor and Deputy Governor in Norges 
Bank. We take this opportunity to thank them all for being willing to share with us their 
time and insights as to the conduct of monetary policy in Norway. 
 
The views of the authors on specific issues are summarized throughout the Report. Also, 
an opening statement is offered at the start of each chapter (except for this one) 
highlighting important issues and conclusions. 
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2 Institutional framework and decision making process 
 
In our view there are indications that Norges Bank interprets the policy mandate in 
a too narrow way, by downplaying the objective of monetary policy also 
contributing to exchange rate stabilization. We find the existing policy mandate 
appropriate. In some situations, a clause about exchange rate stability in the 
mandate, and Norges Bank reminding the market about it, may affect market 
participants’ expectations, thus contributing to exchange rate stability. As a matter 
of principle, the statement of the objectives for the monetary policy given in policy 
documents as the Inflation Report should be complete, not excluding the part about 
exchange rate stability.  
 
The procedure of having the Governor submitting his suggested proposals to the 
Board, the day before Board meetings, to the Ministry of Finance, does not limit the 
policy options considered by the Board. The Government’s right to instruct Norges 
Bank does not limit the Bank in its execution of monetary policy. This option acts as 
an escape valve and as a means for rapid decision making. We see no reason for 
scrapping it.  
 
More resources committed to the Board should be considered like providing outside 
Board members with research assistants within the Bank. Also, time and money 
devoted for the outside Board members to be working on monetary policy could be 
enlarged. 
 
 
 
2.1 The interpretation of the policy mandate 
 
The mandate for the monetary policy, as given by the Government on 29 March 2001, 
states that 
 
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and 
international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate 
developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by 
contributing to stable developments in output and employment. 
 
Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.  
 
Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the 
first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational 
target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of 
approximately 2.5 per cent over time. In general, the direct effects on consumer 
prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and 
extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. 
 
Norges Bank’s interpretation of its mandate in the introduction to the Inflation Report, 
reads as follows, 
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Objective 
The operational target of monetary policy is low and stable inflation, with annual 
consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. In general, 
direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, 
excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances are not taken into account. 
 
Implementation 
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given 
to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. 
Monetary policy influences the economy with long and variable lags. Norges 
Bank sets the interest rate with a view to stabilising inflation at the target within a 
reasonable time horizon, normally 1–3 years. 
 
The more precise horizon will depend on disturbances to which the economy is 
exposed and how they will affect the path for inflation and the real economy 
ahead.” 
 
In its letter to the Ministry of Finance of 27 March 2001, in connection with the new 
mandate, Norges Bank describes the role of the exchange rate as follows 
 
“The krone is floating, and the value of the krone fluctuates periodically, as do the 
exchange rates of other small and open economies. The best contribution 
monetary policy can make to stabilising exchange rate expectations is to aim at 
the objective of low and stable inflation. Changes in the Norwegian interest rate 
level have a predictable effect on the krone exchange rate only when they also 
contribute to low and stable inflation.” 
 
These statements indicate that there is a discrepancy between the mandate and the 
interpretation given by Norges Bank. The first sentence in the mandate specifies that 
monetary policy should aim at stability in the krone’s national and international value, 
contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. However, 
exchange rate stability is not mentioned in Norges Bank’s interpretation. This 
discrepancy has also been pointed out by previous Norges Bank Watch reports. The 2002 
Report argues that the reference to exchange rate stability should be removed from the 
mandate, while the 2004 Report recommends that the interpretation should be clarified.  
However, more recently, Norges Bank has changed its formulations on the motivation for 
exchange rate stability. The Annual Report of 2002 maintains the early and narrow focus 
on low inflation: 
“Norges Bank no longer targets a specific level for the krone exchange rate. 
Developments in the krone are nevertheless of considerable importance for 
Norges Bank's interest rate setting. [...] The value of Norwegian krone will vary, 
as will the value of other countries' currencies. Norges Bank's response to a 
change in the exchange rate will depend on how the change influences inflation.” 
 
In contrast, the Annual Report of 2003 also mentions the effect of the exchange rate on 
output and employment: 
 
“Norges Bank has no specific target for the level of the exchange rate. However, 
changes in the krone exchange rate are nonetheless of central importance in 
12 
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interest-rate setting because they affect inflation and developments in activity. 
The response to a change in the exchange rate will depend on its expected impact 
on inflation, output and employment.” 
 
The role of the exchange rate in connection with the policy mandate is also discussed in 
speeches, e.g. in the one given by the Governor on 7 June 2004:  
“The first paragraph of the mandate sets forth its intentions. The last paragraph 
specifies what Norges Bank is required to do.  
The first sentence in the mandate refers to the value of the krone. Stability in the 
internal value of the krone implies that inflation must be low and stable. Low and 
stable inflation fosters economic growth and stability in financial and property 
markets.  
The regulation also states that monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the 
Norwegian krone’s external value, contributing to stable expectations concerning 
exchange rate developments.  
With open trade with other countries and free capital movements, we do not have 
the instruments to fine-tune the krone exchange rate. The krone has appreciated 
when economic activity has been high and there have been expectations of a wide 
interest rate differential between Norway and other countries. The krone has 
depreciated when activity has declined and the interest rate differential has 
narrowed. There is also a strong tendency for the krone to revert to a level that 
stabilises the price level in Norway relative to our trading partners, measured in a 
common currency. 
The task of monetary policy is to provide a nominal anchor. The inflation target is 
such an anchor. “ 
 
These latter formulations are closer to the discussion of the role of the exchange rate in 
policy documents from the Government, e.g. Kredittmeldinga 2003, where one among 
other things emphasizes the importance of the exchange rate for inflation and output.  
 
The change in the Bank’s formulations is in harmony with our talks with the social 
partners, where we repeatedly heard that Norges Bank now was more concerned about 
the exchange rate than it was 2-3 years ago. However, it is still the case that the role of 
the exchange rate is neglected in the formulations in the introduction to the Inflation 
Report. 
  
Given the specification in the mandate that inflation is the operational target, it is clear 
that Norges Bank should not sacrifice the inflation target in pursuing a specific target for 
the exchange rate. However, as we point out in chapter 3.2, under flexible inflation 
targeting, the interest rate is not pinned down exactly by the inflation target. In situations 
where the exchange rate is viewed as very weak or very strong, there might be room for 
the central bank to keep an eye on the effect on the exchange rate, as long as this is not 
inconsistent with the inflation target.  
 
This view was adopted with the 2002 change of the monetary policy mandate in New 
Zealand, where it was specified that  
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“In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall implement monetary 
policy in a sustainable, consistent and transparent manner, and shall seek to avoid 
unnecessary instability in output, real interest rates and the exchange rate.” 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/statements/mar05.pdf. 
 
In most situations, a clause on the exchange rate, or a possibility of interventions by the 
Bank (see discussion in Chapter 3.2), will not affect monetary policy nor the exchange 
rate. However, in a situation where the krone is very weak or very strong, the risk as seen 
from the market participants that the central bank will act to move the krone may be a 
risk that they do not want to take. If this is the way market participants reason, the central 
bank may contribute to exchange rate stability without compromising on its inflation 
target.  
 
NBW’s view:  
There are indications that Norges Bank interprets the policy mandate in a too 
narrow way, by downplaying the objective of monetary policy also to contribute to 
exchange rate stabilization. We find the existing policy mandate appropriate. In 
some situations, a clause about exchange rate stability in the mandate, and Norges 
Bank reminding the market about it, may affect market participants’ expectations, 
thus contributing to exchange rate stability. As a matter of principle, the statement 
of the objective for the monetary policy given in policy documents as the Inflation 
Report should be complete, not excluding the part about exchange rate stability.  
 
 
2.2 Central bank independence 
 
A very important aspect of an inflation targeting regime is the instrument independence 
of the central bank. In the case of Norway the Ministry of Finance is informed the day 
before the Board meets of what the Governor and Deputy Governor will put on the table 
concerning the decision on interest rates. The Ministry may offer its comments on the 
suggested decision. Those views are communicated to the other Board members the next 
day. This procedure neither limits the deliberations in the Board nor the decision that is 
finally made. The Executive Board of Norges Bank alone is responsible for monetary 
policy decisions taken. 
  
Once the rate decision is made, a letter informing the Ministry of Finance is dispatched 
from Norges Bank. Later in the day, usually at 14:00, the decision is made known to the 
public at large, on a press conference as well as on the web. 
 
The Board is free to change the recommendation suggested by the Governor to the 
Ministry of Finance. Thus, this procedure does not limit Norges Bank’s deliberations and 
decision making vis-a-vis the Ministry of Finance. However, one may wonder whether it 
limits the arguments and policy options outside directors of the Board are likely to put 
forward on the Board meetings.  
 
Norges Bank is quite explicit on the fact that the prior information to the Ministry of 
Finance does not remove the Board from the responsibility it has for taking the 
appropriate decisions.  
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A related issue of a more constitutional character, is whether the Government’s right to 
instruct Norges Bank should be terminated. It was applied for the first time in March 
2001, as the vehicle through which inflation targeting was introduced. When the right to 
instruct is being employed, Norges Bank shall receive notice beforehand. When the 
Storting is informed about the Government’s use of its right to instruct, the Storting shall 
also receive Norges Bank’s view on the issue. To instruct the Bank on its interest rate 
decision, however, is not on the agenda. If it were, it would be tantamount to asking the 
Governor to resign.  
 
The overall constitutional responsibility for economic policy rests with the Ministry of 
Finance. Monetary policy, being part of the overall economic policy, thus also is within 
the purview of the Ministry. An unforeseen situation arising in which the Ministry’s right 
to instruct Norges Bank would be a useful device does not seem likely, but it cannot be 
ruled out completely either. A right for a Ministry to instruct lower level decision making 
bodies is in the Norwegian legal tradition. It acts as an escape valve and as a means for 
rapid decision making (cf. March 2001). We disagree with NBW-04 (p. 78) on the need 
for reforming the institutional framework to strengthen the formal independence of 
Norges Bank.  
 
NBW’s view:  
The procedure of having the Governor submitting his suggested proposals to the 
Board, the day before Board meetings, to the Ministry of Finance, does not limit the 
policy options considered by the Board. However, it may limit the influence of the 
outside directors. The Government’s right to instruct Norges Bank does not limit 
the Bank in its execution of monetary policy. This option acts as an escape valve and 
as a means for rapid decision making. We see no reason for scrapping it.  
 
 
2.3 More resources to the Board? 
 
Professor Alan Blinder who was on the FOMC for a few years, states that this experience 
  
“left him with a strong feeling that the theoretical fiction that monetary policy is 
made by a single individual maximizing a well-defined preference function 
misses something important. In my view, monetary theorists should start paying 
attention to the nature of decision making by committee, which is rarely 
mentioned in the academic literature.” (Quoted from Chappell jr. et al, 2004, p. 1) 
 
As of January 1, 2004 the composition of the Executive Board of Norges Bank was 
changed. The practice of having political parties nominating Board members was 
discontinued. The Ministry of Finance should pick members with a broad background, 
including particular knowledge of economics and finance. (Of the five outside directors 
of the Board we now find two professional economists.) This, we venture, makes for 
better decision making on monetary policy matters in general and on interest rate changes 
in particular. However, should monetary economists take the advice of professor Blinder 
and start paying attention to the nature of decision making by committee? 
 
To be more concrete in the Norwegian case, is the Board properly set up? Are the 
deliberations as free and constructive as they possibly can be? Should there be more than 
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two outside professionals on the Board? Should these professionals have more resources 
available in the Bank and a larger work assignment? 
 
We have not gone into the internal decision making process of the Board. However, one 
may wonder whether the contribution of the external Board members to the monetary 
policy decisions is limited by the time and resources they have available. More resources 
committed to the Board should be considered, like providing outside Board members 
with research assistants within the Bank. Also, time and money devoted for the outside 
Board members to be working on monetary policy could be enlarged. The effect would 
quite likely be better and more educated discussions in the Board meetings; an increase in 
the number of available options for action; and a better decision making process.1
 
When discussing the decision making process in central banks Faust and Henderson 
(2004, p. 133) make the point that “multiple heterogeneous policymakers may pose a 
practical problem for transparent communication.” One response to this would be a 
multistage decision making process, which they explain as follows: “First, the Board 
agrees on the goals of monetary policy, i.e., interprets the given mandate. Next, taking the 
goal as given, the Board agrees on the model of the economy. Finally, the Board makes 
policy taking the goals and model as given.” This seems to be an orderly way of going 
about the business of determining interest rates. Also, it is our impression that this may be 
a good description of the way in which Norges Bank’s Board work.  
 
However, Faust and Henderson go on to question whether multistage decision making is 
efficient or not. Imagine a Board on which one finds policy-oriented economists like 
James Tobin and Milton Friedman. The multistage approach, they then argue (p. 133),  
 
“would require that they agree first on goals, next on the model, and only then 
consider policy options, given those goals and model. In an alternative approach, 
we could simply charge them with agreeing on and implementing policy. One 
suspects that the multistage approach may not even be feasible in practice. There 
is at least room to differ regarding which approach would lead to better policy”  
 
The multistage approach has much to be recommended as far as organizing the 
discussions in the Board are concerned. However, as reasonable economists will disagree 
on the reasonable model of the economy, and thus on the likely effects of given actions 
taken by the monetary authorities, too strict adherence to the multistage decision making 
process, may come in the way of open and frank discussions of possible policy options 
and likely outcomes. 
 
NBW’s view:  
More resources committed to the Board should be considered like providing outside 
Board members with research assistants within the Bank. Also, time and money 
devoted for the outside Board members to be working on monetary policy could be 
enlarged. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The arrangement suggested here is along the lines of how the MPC in the Bank of England was set up in 
1997. 
16 
 N O R G E S  B A N K  W A T C H  -  2 0 0 5  
3 The inflation target 
 
In 2004, the rate of inflation targeted by Norges Bank was 0.3 percent, far below the 
2.5 precent target. Thus, a direct evaluation according to a standard loss function 
for a central bank only caring about inflation and output variability, would 
presumably indicate that monetary policy is highly unsuccessful. Yet there is 
currently almost no criticism of monetary policy in Norway. Observers, be it 
politicians, social partners, market participants - with few exceptions - do not 
consider the very low rate of inflation an important problem, as long as the real 
economy is doing well. On the other hand, many of the same observers are really 
concerned about the future development of variables that monetary policy, 
narrowly conceived, should not care about. This discrepancy suggests that either the 
theoretical framework is too narrow, or that most observers do not really 
understand what is going on. The former, we believe, is the case. 
 
Under a flexible inflation target, the central bank cares about low and stable 
inflation, as well as output stability. When inflation variability is a sign of instability 
in the real economy, addressing this instability usually also involves an appropriate 
policy for the real economy. However, when inflation variability is caused by other 
factors, such as exogenous supply shocks, inflation variability does not imply similar 
costs to society.  
 
Large fluctuations in the real exchange rate may involve considerable costs for the 
economy. Correspondingly, large changes in interest rates increase the risk that 
some households and enterprises make financial decisions based on incorrect 
expectations. Under flexible inflation targeting, the interest rate is not pinned down 
exactly by the inflation target. Thus, in some situations there may be scope to also 
take other considerations. When the exchange rate is viewed as very weak or very 
strong, one may allow a longer horizon for reaching the inflation target. The central 
bank may also try to avoid setting very low or very high interest rates, as long as 
this is consistent with the inflation and output objectives. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how and to what extent recent 
developments in economics, broadly defined, can contribute to improving the 
performance of inflation targeting central banks. Thus, the chapter focuses on issues 
that are often neglected in central bank rhetoric, and it does not aim at providing a 
complete review.  
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3.1 General observations 
 
Under flexible inflation targeting as it is pursued by Norges Bank, monetary policy aims 
at both low and stable inflation, and at stabilizing output. In Governor Svein Gjedrem's 
words:  
 
“The inflation target represents a framework for, not an obstacle to, monetary 
policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. We have chosen 
flexible inflation targeting. Variability in output and employment as well as 
inflation is given weight. “ 
 
In general, inflation targeting central banks appear to follow a monetary policy that works 
much better than many of the policy regimes we have seen in the past. 
 
However, the theoretical framework adopted by most inflation targeting central banks is 
rather narrow, both when it comes to what monetary policy may achieve, and to what 
monetary policy should care about. This narrow focus reflects policy experiences in the 
past, where monetary policy often aimed at infeasible or inconsistent targets, leading to 
the combination of high inflation and a weak real economy.  
 
Within the institutional framework that exists in most countries, including Norway, where 
the central bank is given operational independence and a clear mandate for achieving 
price stability, and inflation expectations seem well anchored at low levels, the risk of 
repeating the high inflation experience seems quite limited (see e.g. Blinder, 1995). Has 
the time come for monetary policy to move on? Avoiding high inflation will clearly 
always be a priority. Yet one should broaden the focus in the hope of improving the 
conduct of monetary policy in a low inflation environment, and avoiding other types of 
serious macroeconomic problems. 
 
The mainstream theoretical framework of inflation targeting tends to focus only on 
variability in inflation and output. This neglects that recent research has demonstrated 
that one can not rule out monetary policy having long-lasting effects on output and 
employment levels. Furthermore, much of this literature exaggerates the costs of inflation 
variability. When inflation variability is a sign of instability in the real economy, 
addressing this instability usually also involves an appropriate policy for the real 
economy. However, when inflation variability is caused by other factors, as exogenous 
supply shocks, they do not imply similar costs to society. In contrast, there is reason to 
believe that variability in other variables, such as exchange rates, financial imbalances, 
and interest rates, do entail real costs. Yet inflation targeting central banks usually do not 
care unless inflation and output are affected.  
 
The current Norwegian situation is a case in point. Given the large deviation from the 2.5 
percent inflation target, a direct evaluation according to a standard loss function for a 
central bank only caring about inflation and output variability, would presumably indicate 
a very bad outcome. Yet there is currently almost no criticism of monetary policy in 
Norway. Observers, be it politicians, social partners, market participants - with few 
exceptions - do not consider the very low rate of inflation an important problem, as long 
as the real economy is doing well. On the other hand, many of the same observers are 
really concerned about the future development of variables that monetary policy, 
narrowly conceived, should not be concerned with. This discrepancy suggests that either 
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the theoretical framework is too narrow, or that most observers do not really understand 
what is going on. The former, we believe, is the case. 
 
Norges Bank has shown an open mind and a willingness to learn over the past few years. 
Yet the Bank definitely entertains the same theoretical ideas that most other inflation 
targeting central banks do. This suggests that there are gains to be reaped from an even 
more open attitude.  
 
To what extent a somewhat broader view on monetary policy will matter for the policy 
decisions is less clear, however. First, many central banks, including Norges Bank, 
usually show more pragmatism than what can be inferred from their presentations and 
policy statements. Second, the practical implications from a conclusion that a central 
bank should care about exchange rates, financial imbalances, and interest rates, and in 
some situations also about the level of output, are often not clear, the reason being the 
profession’s limited understanding of how real economies work.  
 
 
3.2 The theoretical framework  
 
Some of the economic literature on monetary policy and inflation targeting is quite 
explicit on what monetary policy can achieve, and what it cannot achieve (see e.g. NBW-
02). The standard view is that while monetary policy in the short run may affect both real 
and nominal variables, it can only affect nominal variables in the medium and long run. 
More explicitly, monetary policy, it is concluded, can have no lasting effect on real 
variables like the real exchange rate, the level of output, or the rate of unemployment. 
This view is also reflected in Norges Bank’s policy documents. 
 
The motivation for the emphasis on this conclusion is easy to understand. There are many 
episodes, from Norway and other countries, where monetary policy has been too 
expansionary, in an attempt to stimulate the economy, reduce unemployment and/or 
improve competitiveness, at the costs of increased inflation. These episodes have shown 
that the long run effects of a too expansionary monetary policy are high inflation, not 
higher output or lower unemployment. 
 
The standard view is based on the notion that in the long run, output and employment are 
determined from the supply side of the economy, by labour supply, real capital 
(determined by saving behaviour) and technology, as well as wage and price setting 
behaviour. Monetary policy, it is contended, cannot affect these variables. However, there 
are many contributions in the economic literature showing that this view is too simplistic.  
 
One line of argument emphasises that supply side factors do not give a unique prediction 
for how the economy evolves. In the vocabulary of the economic literature, there are 
several or a range of equilibria of the economy. In other words, several different 
outcomes are possible, with high or low levels of output (see e.g. Howitt and MacAfee, 
1992; Lamont, 1995; McDonald, 1995). While these contributions are not specific as to 
the role of monetary policy, it seems reasonable to assume that monetary policy might 
affect which path is realised. 
 
Other contributions are more specific as to the role of monetary policy. In an economy 
with dominant wage setters, as is probably a good description of the Norwegian one, 
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several recent contributions have analysed the interaction between monetary policy and 
wage setters as a strategic game. A key conclusion is that a strict monetary regime, which 
responds aggressively to high wage growth, may dampen wage pressure (Bratsiotis and 
Martin, 1999; Soskice and Iversen, 2001). The intuition for this result is that when 
deciding whether to increase wages, wage setters compare the gain from higher wages 
with the loss in the form of reduced employment. If monetary policy is strict, high wage 
growth will be more costly in the form of reduced employment, and wage setters will set 
lower wages. In equilibrium, the wage moderation will lead to lower unemployment, 
even without affecting real wages. The reduction in unemployment is not a temporary 
phenomenon, and it will also have a permanent positive impact on output.  
 
The beneficial effect on wage setting of tight monetary policy is consistent with the 
recent Norwegian experience, where tight monetary policy in 2002 contributed to lower 
wage growth in subsequent years, thus allowing for lower interest rates that stimulate 
output and employment. 
 
A second conclusion in the recent literature on economies with large wage setters, is that 
the monetary regime may also have long run effect on the real exchange rate and the size 
of the traded sector. Holden (2003) and Vartiainen (2002) show that the type of monetary 
regime determines the relative degree of wage moderation in the traded and non-traded 
sectors, via the effect on wage setters’ trade off of higher wages versus reduced 
employment, as explained above. A monetary regime aiming at exchange rate stability 
gives stronger incentives for wage moderation in the traded sector, and weaker incentives 
in the non-traded sector, thus strengthening the traded sector and weakening the non-
traded one. 
 
Ball (1999) argues that monetary policy may also have persistent effects on 
unemployment via the effect on aggregate demand. He considers monetary policy in the 
downturns of the 1980s, comparing the responses in the US and Canada on the one hand, 
with those of the UK, France, West-Germany and Italy on the other. The North American 
central banks cut interest rates in response to the downturns, with the explicit motivation 
of stimulating the economy. In contrast, the European central banks maintained interest 
rates. In the following years, growth was markedly higher in the US and Canada. The 
European downturns led to persistent higher unemployment rates.  
 
The conclusion by Ball that monetary policy in these situations had lasting effects on 
output and unemployment is controversial. While Ball’s view is consistent with e.g. 
Blanchard (2003), the explanations on European unemployment that have received most 
attention focus on the importance of labour market and wage setting institutions (see e.g. 
Nickell et al, 2003), with no lasting role for monetary policy.   
 
The contributions referred to above, though using methods that are well accepted within 
the profession, take a different approach than most of the recent literature on monetary 
policy. The leading approach, sometimes referred to as New Keynesian or the New 
Neoclassical Synthesis (Clarida et al, 1999, Woodford, 2003, Canzoneri, Cumby and 
Diba, 2005), is also the theoretical framework embraced by inflation targeting central 
banks, including Norges Bank. While this approach to monetary economics has made 
important progress in recent years, it does not fully reflect the insight that has been found 
in other parts of economic literature. 
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In research, a narrow methodological focus may often be useful to make progress. 
However, for a broad understanding of the mechanisms that are at work in a real 
economy, a more eclectic approach seems preferable. Thus, inflation targeting central 
banks run the risk of being too narrow in their understanding of monetary policy, by 
being too attached to the main approach. In fact, even recent contributions within the 
main approach are questioning key parts of this very framework, underscoring the need 
for a broader perspective. 
 
A crucial concept in monetary policy decisions is the output gap, traditionally defined as 
the difference between actual and potential output. Potential output is usually measured 
as trend output, i.e. some sort of average, actual output. However, recent theoretical 
contributions argue that the output gap should be defined as the difference between actual 
output and the level of output that would have prevailed had all prices been completely 
flexible. Measurement of the level of output that would have prevailed under flexible 
prices is in its infancy, and the relationship between this concept, and the traditional trend 
output, is not clear. Woodford (2003, page 616) argues that: 
 
“Furthermore, we have seen that there is at least some evidence that conventional 
output-gap measures (essentially de-trended output) are not at all closely related 
to the output-gap variable in the theoretical analysis. [..] It follows that a central 
bank that raises interest rates when a conventional gap measure (de-trended 
output) is high may be responding in quite different way than my optimal rule 
would prescribe.” 
 
Wright (2004) offers another example of recent research unsettling established “truths”. 
Conventional wisdom has it that the proper monetary policy response to higher inflation 
is to raise the nominal interest rates a bit more, thus raising the real rate. However, by 
extending the New Keynesian framework to include credit rationing and nominal debt 
contracts, Wright shows that allowing the real interest rate to decline may be preferable 
under plausible circumstances.  
 
The literature described above, questioning conventional wisdom as to the effects of 
monetary policy, reflects the fact that economics is a social science, with more 
uncertainty as to key findings and relationships than what is the case in most of the 
natural sciences. Clearly, this aspect cannot, and should not, make us disregard the main 
conclusions in monetary economics. The key propositions that monetary policy should 
provide a nominal anchor to the economy, and that we cannot permanently reduce 
unemployment by allowing inflation above some minimum level, seem very robust. 
However, it does call for some caution and modesty, as well as openness to new ideas 
and thoughts. 
 
At this point it is relevant to give Norges Bank credit for establishing a regional network, 
consisting of enterprises, organisations and local authorities throughout Norway. The 
network was introduced in the fall of 2002. It provides the Bank with early and frequent 
information, as well as supplementary information about areas not covered by other 
statistical sources. The Bank may also learn which issues are of particular concern to 
enterprises. Such information may give the Bank a different perspective than it gets from 
the traditional monetary policy analyses.  
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NBW’s view:  
Norges Bank’s policy documents reflect the work of a highly competent staff. The 
Bank follows the current thinking and progress on inflation targeting. However, as 
the main approach to monetary policy is methodologically rather narrow, it is 
important that Norges Bank is open also to other parts of the economic literature, 
and to other perspectives on monetary policy. The regional network provides the 
Bank with useful information from a different perspective. 
 
 
 
3.3 The role of the exchange rate  
 
In a small open economy like the Norwegian one, stabilising consumer price inflation is 
facilitated when the effective nominal exchange rate is stabilised. If, say, the krone 
appreciates sharply, the central bank must quite often respond by cutting the interest rate, 
to avoid cheaper imports causing inflation to fall below the target. On the other hand, it is 
also clear that with an inflation target, monetary policy can not prevent, and should not 
try to prevent, exchange rate changes that are caused by different target rates of inflation. 
Nor can monetary policy affect changes in the exchange rate due to changes in 
equilibrium real exchange rates.  
 
However, the question remains whether monetary policy should put additional weight on 
the exchange rate, above what is implied by the inflation target. According to the 
mainstream view, the answer is no (see e.g. NBW-02). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) go so 
far as to argue that an inward looking monetary policy, solely occupied with domestic 
shocks, delivers the best possible outcome.  
 
Yet there are also a number of contributions advocating that monetary policy should give 
additional and separate concern to the exchange rate. Krugman (1987) shows that a 
period of strong appreciation of the real exchange rate may weaken the traded sector, thus 
harming productivity growth in this sector with long run adverse effects on the country’s 
international competitiveness. Tille (2002) points out that much of the previous literature 
overstates the gains from exchange rate flexibility by neglecting shocks that have 
different impact on different parts of the economy. Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) 
demonstrate that when there is incomplete pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations into 
prices, optimal policy should also focus on reducing exchange rate volatility. Against this 
view, Obstfeld (2002) maintains that the recent resurgence of “exchange rate pessimism”, 
i.e. contributions questioning the gains from exchange rate flexibility, stems from 
oversimplified modelling strategies rather than from empirically based evidence.  
 
The recent contributions and controversies reflect the fact that the General Theory of 
Exchange Rate Determination remains to be worked out. We know that changes in the 
interest rate do affect the exchange rate, but the relationship often appears unstable, and 
the literature abounds with conflicting evidence (see Bjørnland, 2005, for recent 
Norwegian evidence). Yet policy decisions have to be made, in spite of our limited 
knowledge and understanding. 
 
Experiences from several countries indicate that large fluctuations in real exchange rates 
can be very costly. While firms can buy financial instruments to reduce the costs 
associated with short run exchange rate fluctuations, there are no financial instruments 
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that can prevent large real exchange rate fluctuations from affecting firms’ location and 
investment decisions.  In contrast, there is little indication in the economic literature of 
large costs associated with small deviations from the targeted rate of inflation.2
 
Large costs from large real exchange rate fluctuations and small costs from small 
inflation fluctuations may be taken as an argument for a dual target, emphasising both 
inflation and the exchange rate. However, a dual regime will be less transparent, leading 
to an unpredictable and unstable policy. Under inflation targeting, inflation is the nominal 
anchor and must be given priority. Nevertheless, under flexible inflation targeting, the 
interest rate is not pinned down exactly by the inflation target. In situations where the 
exchange rate is viewed as very weak or very strong, one may allow a longer horizon for 
reaching the inflation target, thus providing room to take the effect on the exchange rate 
into account. 
 
Affecting the exchange rate is not only a matter of interest rate setting. Interventions, 
analyses and communication in certain situations may also play a role. On interventions, 
the Governor of Norges Bank has talked repeatedly, e.g. on 26 August 2004, 
 
“Normally, Norges Bank will not intervene in the foreign exchange market in 
order to influence the exchange rate. [….] However, interventions may be 
appropriate if the krone exchange rate differs substantially from what is 
reasonable on the basis of fundamentals, and exchange rate movements also 
reduce the prospect of achieving the inflation target.”  
 
Economic research and analyses may also be of importance. The Norwegian krone is a 
small currency, and the resources that financial institutions are able put into analysis of 
the krone exchange rate are limited. Norges Bank’s analyses and communication may 
contribute to anchoring exchange rate expectations, as long as the analyses and 
communication are consistent with the policy that is pursued. Some years ago, the 
discussion about the need for a real appreciation due to increased spending of petroleum 
revenues, may have contributed to the strong appreciation of the krone. More recently, 
research in Norges Bank documenting that there is a strong tendency for the krone to 
revert to a level that stabilises the price level in Norway relative to our trading partners, 
measured in a common currency (Akram, 2003), may have contributed to exchange rate 
stability. 
 
NBW’s view:  
Large fluctuations in the real exchange rate may involve considerable costs for the 
economy. Under flexible inflation targeting, the interest rate is not pinned down 
exactly by the inflation target. In situations where the exchange rate is viewed as 
very weak or very strong, one may allow a longer horizon for reaching the inflation 
target, thus providing room to take the effect on the exchange rate into account. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Børsum and Ødegaard (2005) for evidence on how Norwegian firms handle exchange rate 
uncertainty. 
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3.4  Financial imbalances and monetary policy  
 
Internationally, considerable attention is given to the question of whether financial 
stability should be a separate concern for monetary policy. It is widely accepted that 
financial stability is important, and that low and stable inflation in general contributes to 
ensuring financial stability. Moreover, it is clear that if the financial system becomes 
unstable, this will usually lead to volatility in inflation and output, variables that central 
banks always will care about under inflation targeting. For this reason, the probably 
dominant view is that a forward-looking and flexible inflation targeting regime, should 
encompass the concern for financial stability without giving it an explicit role (Bean, 
2003). In contrast, e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that a central bank that is successful 
in keeping inflation low, runs the risk that the credibility of the inflation target masks the 
build up of imbalances in the real economy, increasing the risk of financial instability. 
 
In a recent contribution, Disyata (2005) argues that unless financial imbalances is part of 
the loss function of the central bank, the monetary authorities should not attempt to prick 
bubbles in asset markets. To the extent that rapid increases in asset prices impinge upon 
the future development of the CPI, the consequences of booming asset markets for 
interest rate setting are already taken into account by a forward looking central bank. 
However, if the central bank explicitly cares for avoiding financial imbalances, this 
should be taken into account over and above the effect on output and inflation. 
 
In our view, there are good reasons to believe that financial imbalances should be a 
concern for monetary policy, above what is reflected in variability in output and inflation. 
The costs associated with variability in output and inflation depends on the sources of the 
variability. A change in output caused by a change in preferences or technology may not 
involve any costs per se.3 In contrast, a change in output due to households having made 
inappropriate decisions based on incorrect expectations as to financial variables will 
generally be costly.  
 
In practice, it is often difficult to know how a concern for financial imbalances should be 
reflected in monetary policy. If asset prices are increasing at a rapid rate and over a long 
period of time, it is difficult to know whether a bubble is in the making. Also, how to 
handle such a situation is far from straightforward.  
 
Concern for financial imbalances, as well as concern for households’ consumption and 
debt decisions, nevertheless suggests that the central bank should aim at dampening 
interest rate volatility. The interest rate is more than an instrument of monetary policy. It 
is a price (on money), and as such, the central bank should not have a specific target for 
the interest rate. However, it seems clear that if households and enterprises make 
decisions on the basis of interest rate expectations that turn out to be incorrect, this may 
involve real costs.4 For example, if households base their consumption decisions on too 
low expectations of future interest rates, they may consume too much and accumulate 
                                                 
3 In fact, with an appropriately defined output gap, potential and actual output will move together, and the 
output gap might not be affected. However, with standard estimates of the output gap, it will be affected, 
see the quote of Woodford above. 
4 See the speech by the First Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank on 16 March 2005 for a related view.  
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large debts.5 When interest rates rise, large debts may force households to increase their 
labour supply. This will have a positive effect on output, which may dampen the negative 
effect of debt via reduced demand. However, the increase in labour supply in this 
example reflects a reduction in welfare arising from households making decisions on 
incorrect expectations.  
 
NBW’s view:  
The interest rate is primarily an instrument to be used to ensure low and stable 
inflation as well as a stable real economy. When the economy changes the interest 
rate must also change.  However, large changes in interest rates increase the risk 
that households and enterprises make financial decisions based on incorrect 
expectations. A concern for the negative consequences of large changes in the 
interest rate suggests that the central bank should try to avoid setting very low or 
very high interest rates, as long as this is consistent with the inflation and output 
objectives. 
 
 
Housing prices and the inflation target 
Recently, it has been argued that housing prices should have been included in the 
inflation rate that Norges Bank targets. As housing prices have increased considerably, 
the adjusted inflation rate would have been higher, and Norges Bank should have set a 
higher interest rate (Aftenposten, 17 February 2005). This argument raises several issues. 
First, measurement of consumer prices is Statistics Norway’s responsibility. In our view, 
measurement of the cost of housing is difficult, and it is not at all obvious which method 
is the most appropriate one (see discussion in Økonomisk Utsyn 1/2005, page 115). 
Statistics Norway’s argument that households’ house purchases should be seen as 
investment in assets, and thus be disregarded, is a strong one. Yet one may also argue that 
the current use of rents as a measure of housing costs is not really capturing the real costs 
many households face. Also, the statistical treatment of purchases of cars (which 
technically is an investment yielding a future stream of consumption services) shows that 
the practice is open for judgments.  
 
If housing prices in some form were to be incorporated in the consumer price index, 
would it affect the interest rate setting of Norges Bank? Clearly, if one were to change the 
index, one might also allow for a change in the numerical target, just as one recently 
changed the inflation target from 2.5 to 2 percent in UK, when a new index was adopted. 
The 2.5 percent target was chosen based on a presumption that this was suitable for the 
Norwegian economy, and with a different index, a different numerical value might have 
been found suitable. Second, to the extent that the development of housing prices is 
affecting other prices, and the stability of the overall economy, Norges Bank should 
already have taken this into consideration under flexible inflation targeting. Third, if 
housing prices were included in the index, Norges Bank would probably have put less 
emphasis on them than their weight would suggest, as housing prices fluctuate so much. 
In spite of these arguments, we believe that housing prices would have had larger 
influence on interest rate setting if they had been included in the index that the Norges 
                                                 
5 Incidentally, according to the survey undertaken by TNS Gallup for Norges Bank in the first quarter of  
2005, more than one third of all households expected the interest rate to remain unchanged in the next 12 
months, in contrast to the expected future increase of interest of about one percent, as given by the financial 
markets.  
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Bank were targeting. Given the recent rapid growth in housing prices, this would 
probably have implied that current interest rates had been higher. 
 
3.5 How to evaluate the current low rate of inflation 
 
The striking aspect of monetary policy during 2004 is the low rate of inflation. Consumer 
prices grew by 0.4 percent from 2003 to 2004. Adjusted for tax changes and excluding 
energy prices, CPI – ATE, which is the measure adopted by Norges Bank, prices grew by 
0.3 percent, far below the 2.5 percent target. CPI-ATE grew by 1.1 percent from 2002 to 
2003, also well below the target. One might expect that this large difference would cause 
considerable discussion and criticism in the policy debate. By and large, this has not been 
the case.  
 
Most observers, including those we have met with on working with this Report, do not 
see the low inflation rate as an important problem. While several of our discussion 
partners acknowledged that it would have been better if the inflation target had been 
realised, others just see the low inflation as the result of mostly benevolent changes 
taking place. The general view among our discussion partners was that maintaining a 
stable development of the real economy should be given priority to pushing the rate of 
inflation up to the targeted level.  
 
The low inflation rate could raise several types of concerns 
• a risk for deflation and depression 
• inefficient resource allocation 
• a reduction in inflation expectations 
• a too expansionary fiscal policy 
• symmetry and credibility 
• the fact that the central bank misses the policy target, apart from any direct 
economic implication 
 
Deflation and depression? 
To many observers, falling prices make memories of deflation and serious economic 
downturns alive, cf. the experiences of many countries, including Norway, in the 1920s 
and 1930s. More recently, Japan has experienced a decade of weak economic growth, 
combined with periods of falling prices. However, in these episodes, falling prices have 
been the result of weak demand, where firms cut prices and wages to dampen the 
reduction in output. Falling prices may exacerbate the weak demand, via three channels. 
First, the real interest rate may become too high, due to the combination of negative price 
growth and the nominal interest rate being restricted to be non-negative. Second, real 
wages may become too high, as downward nominal rigidity in the wage setting prevents 
nominal wages from falling in line with the reduction in prices.6 Third, expectations of 
falling prices may make people postpone their purchases, reducing aggregate demand 
further. 
                                                 
6 In recent discussion of the dangers of deflation, the zero bound to nominal interest rates has been the main 
focus. However, as noted below, there is now strong empirical evidence for many industrialized countries 
that, even if wage cuts do occur, downward rigidity exists. Thus, wage cuts are less frequent than they 
would have been if nominal wages had been entirely flexible, implying that real wages are pushed up under 
low inflation.   
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The recent Norwegian experience of low inflation is, however, not of this nature. 
Although low price growth to some extent reflects the previous downturn via reduced 
wage growth and a strong krone, positive supply side factors, as cheaper imports and high 
productivity growth, have been more important. Furthermore, the Norwegian economy is 
recovering, with increasing GDP growth and falling unemployment. Thus, the Norwegian 
economy is not, and has not been, in a situation where weak demand is exacerbated by 
falling prices. 
 
One may nevertheless argue that low price growth involves a considerable risk that the 
situation will turn into a typical “weak demand-deflation episode”, if the economy 
weakens. However, this risk has probably been low, and seems even lower now. Private 
disposable income has increased steadily, implying little risk of a fall in private 
consumption. Nominal wage growth runs at almost 4 percent, above reasonable bounds 
due to downward nominal rigidity.7 With Norges Bank’s interest rate at 1.75 percent, 
there is still considerable room for further reduction if the economy unexpectedly should 
weaken. 
 
 
Inefficient resource allocation 
Price stability makes for efficient resource allocation. If firms set prices in nominal terms 
for longer periods, increasing or falling prices will lead to inefficiencies. As all firms do 
not change their prices at the same time, inflation will distort relative prices (Woodford, 
2003). In contrast, under zero inflation, firms will only change prices if changes in 
relative prices are called for.  
 
The theoretical argument above is based on zero inflation being optimal. As central banks 
target positive inflation rates, recent research sometimes adopts the assumption that firms 
revise prices automatically according to the steady state rate of inflation. Under this 
assumption, it is deviations from the inflation target that will lead to distortions in relative 
prices, and thus to inefficient resource allocation. 
 
This point has been raised in the public debate on Norwegian monetary policy (Mork, 
2005), as an argument for the view that Norges Bank should have cut the interest rate 
even further, so as to push up price growth to the 2.5 percent target faster than under the 
prevailing policy.   
 
However, the theoretical assumption that firms revise prices automatically appears 
empirically implausible. Doing away with this assumption, lower inflation, down towards 
zero, in fact reduces the distortion in relative prices. 
 
Second, apart from the argument above, it seems hard to accept that the efficiency loss 
due to changes in relative prices can be substantial, as firms usually can change prices at 
rather low costs. Low costs of changing prices was acknowledged in previous New 
Keynesian literature (e.g. Mankiw, 1985), but this is neglected in most of the recent 
contributions. 
  
                                                 
7 Holden (1998) finds evidence for the existence of a “floor” to nominal wage growth given in the central 
negotiations in the Norwegian manufacturing sector at 1.5 percent. 
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A third line of reasoning is that monetary policy should be concerned with wage growth 
as well price growth. Erceg et al (2000) shows that if both nominal wages and nominal 
prices are sticky, optimal monetary policy should focus on stabilizing wage growth as 
well as price growth. In fact, Erceg et al (2000) demonstrate that strict price inflation 
targeting involves relatively large welfare losses. Given that wage growth in Norway is 
still above the growth rate in many other countries, the efficiency argument for reducing 
interest rates to push up price growth, clearly also pushing up wage growth, seems weak. 
 
Inflation expectations 
For Norges Bank, a major concern with the low rate of inflation appears to have been the 
effect on inflation expectations. For example, in his annual address, 17 February 2005, 
the Governor stated “It has been important to prevent inflation expectations from falling 
and becoming entrenched at a low level”.  
 
According to Norges Bank’s own surveys of inflation expectations, as measured by a 
survey of the social partners, analysts and academics, this has not happened. While 
inflation expectations over the two year-horizon has drifted downwards by ¼-½ 
percentage points (largely reflecting the revisions to Norges Bank’s own estimates), the 
five-year expectations remain fairly stable at around 2½%. 
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In view of the current low rate of inflation, Norges Bank is clearly justified in its concern 
about inflation expectations, i.e. to what extent observers and market participants believe 
that Norges Bank will succeed in fulfilling its policy objective.  
 
Yet one may argue that Norges Bank has put too much emphasis on this aspect. In fact, 
one can put forward the opposite view that if inflation expectations were to fall, that 
would allow a longer period of low interest rates and high output growth, before inflation 
again is back on the 2.5 percent target. Let us make the argument more specific. 
According to standard macroeconomic theory (the expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve), unemployment can be kept below the natural rate of unemployment, by an 
expansionary policy pushing the rate of inflation below the expected rate. This policy will 
involve a temporary gain, in the form of unemployment below the natural rate. However, 
it will also involve a cost in the form of increased inflation expectations. If inflation 
expectations were to fall below the 2.5 percent target, Norway could enjoy a temporary 
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gain in the form of unemployment below the natural rate, without an associated cost, as 
the induced increase in inflation expectations back to the 2.5 percent level should not be 
counted as a cost.  
 
One may argue that a central bank should not be opportunistic, trying to benefit from 
inflation expectations deviating from the target level. However, this misses the point. The 
argument above does not imply that the central bank should try to manipulate inflation 
expectations, intentionally causing inflation expectations to deviate from the target. To 
the contrary, if inflation expectations are below the target value, the argument above 
suggests that the central bank should pursue an expansionary monetary policy which will 
imply that inflation expectations increase towards the target level. 
 
The heart of the matter is that there is not symmetry as to the costs of deviations of 
inflation expectations from the 2.5 percent target. Pushing inflation expectations down if 
they are above 2.5 is costly, while raising inflation expectations may allow a temporary 
gain. It follows that the central bank should put more emphasis on avoiding inflation 
expectations to rise, if that were the risk, than it should on avoiding inflation expectations 
to fall, as is the risk in the current situation. This suggests that Norges Bank should 
respond to low inflation by setting a low interest rate, aiming at pushing price growth up. 
However, Norges Bank should not be so eager to raise inflation that it pursues a policy 
involving a large risk of excessively stimulating the economy. 
 
The interplay with fiscal policy 
The current economic situation in Norway with large oil revenues put considerable 
pressure on fiscal policy. While there is broad agreement among politicians on the merits 
of the fiscal rule (“Handlingsregelen”), the fiscal deficit has been markedly higher than 
the level specified in the rule. The high unemployment and sluggish economy in 2002 
and 2003 increased the pressure for an even more expansionary fiscal policy. If Norges 
Bank had not cut interest rates in such a decisive manner, fiscal policy might have 
responded by becoming more expansionary, deviating further from the fiscal rule. A 
more expansionary fiscal policy would have been politically difficult to reverse, given the 
high oil revenues. The upshot would have been increased risk of a new appreciation of 
the Norwegian krone, with adverse impact on the manufacturing sector 
 
Symmetry and credibility 
If inflation is above target, and there is no widespread agreement that the economy is 
overheating, raising the interest rate is not a popular measure. In such a situation,  there 
may be fertile ground for uncertainty to spread among wage and price setters as to 
whether the central bank will in fact raise the interest rate to keep inflation down. If such 
uncertainty and lack of credibility arise, it will have detrimental effects in the short run, 
via both higher inflation and lower output. To increase credibility, monetary policy 
should be symmetric: If wage and price setters realise that the central bank is determined 
to get the inflation rate up when it is below the target, they may feel more certain on the 
central bank’s determination of getting inflation down when it is above the target.  
 
It is difficult to evaluate the merits of this argument. On the one hand, the central bank 
may demonstrate the emphasis it puts on meeting the inflation target. On the other hand, 
the ability of the central bank to raise interest rates in spite of political pressure cannot be 
tested in the current situation with low inflation. One would also expect that the central 
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bank is able to communicate that the situation may differ, depending on the sources of 
deviation of the rate of inflation from target. 
 
Missing the policy target 
The Government has given Norges Bank a mandate for its conduct of  monetary policy, 
specifying that the operational target is an annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 
percent over time. In this light, the low inflation is a concern. Clearly, Norges Bank must 
aim at fulfilling the 2.5 percent target. However, the mandate specifies that the inflation 
target is forward looking, and that monetary policy should contribute to stabilising output 
and production. Norges Bank is also quite explicit about this, emphasising that the Bank 
pursues flexible inflation targeting. The fact that the Norwegian economy is growing 
briskly, and unemployment is falling, are valid arguments for Norges Bank to allow 
considerable patience in its pursuit of pushing inflation up, as long as the target is always 
kept in mind. 
 
NBW’s view:   
Low inflation and a negative output gap have called for a low interest rate to 
stimulate the economy, reducing unemployment and pushing inflation up towards 
the 2.5 percent target. To mitigate the risk of excessively stimulating the economy, 
the Bank should not set too low an interest rate. By extending the horizon for 
achieving the 2.5 percent inflation target to 3 years, the Bank does take a cautious 
approach as advocated here. However, given the brisk growth rate the Norwegian 
economy now is experiencing, the time seems ripe for starting the process of 
gradually raising interest rates. 
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BOX 3.1:  CHANGING THE INFLATION TARGET? 
 
With inflation currently running at less than 1 percent, and slight prospects of inflation approaching 2.5 percent 
in the near future, the argument is put forward that the inflation target should be reduced to 2 percent, down to 
the level of Sweden and the UK. It is maintained that a higher inflation target than other countries implies that 
domestic wage growth will exceed wage growth abroad, and, as long as one cannot expect the krone to 
depreciate, this will lead to a steady increase in the cost level relative to our competitors (Nordea, 2005). 
Furthermore, it is argued that the high inflation target implies that the interest rate must be low, which may lead 
to macroeconomic imbalances and financial instability.  
 
These arguments are not really persuasive. There is a strong prediction from economic theory that higher 
domestic inflation will be reflected in a weaker krone. The induced depreciation from an inflation target that is ½ 
- ¾  percentage points higher than elsewhere in Europe would be only 3 – 4.5 percent over 6 years. In a world in 
which annual exchange rate fluctuations of 10 – 15 percent are not uncommon, this is not much. In the short run, 
a change in the inflation target is likely to require Norges Bank to set a higher interest rate, which, combined 
with the lower inflation target, might lead to an appreciation of the krone. The result might easily be a short run 
real appreciation relative to what we can expect under the current regime. 
 
Reducing the inflation target to reduce the gap between the target and the current and expected future inflation 
rates is also problematic because it would give an inappropriate signal about how a flexible inflation targeting 
regime should work. The very low inflation now reflects the difficulty in realising a target for consumer price 
inflation in a small open economy. The appropriate policy response to a temporary cost shock is to accommodate 
the direct effect on inflation, steering monetary policy towards a stable economy with inflation on target in the 
future. If market participants were to take into consideration that large cost shocks of some duration were to lead 
to changes in the inflation target, this would reduce the transparency and credibility of monetary policy. 
 
If one were to choose the inflation target freely now, what level would one choose? There would clearly be an 
argument for choosing the same target as our trading partners, the euro-zone, Sweden and the UK, i.e. 1 ¾ - 2 
percent, even if the importance of this aspect should not be given too much weight, cf. argument above. The 
current low inflation rate, prospects of high productivity growth and cheap imports in the future, also favour a 
similar target. On the other hand, even if productivity growth continues at a high rate and world market prices on 
Norwegian imports continue to fall, monetary policy will nevertheless be able to achieve the existing inflation 
target via a slight nominal depreciation of the krone, and somewhat higher wage growth.  
 
However, it seems wise to take into account that productivity growth and import prices will vary also in the 
future. With a lower inflation target, this might give too small a room for growth in nominal wages. There is 
now strong evidence, for many OECD countries, including Norway, that wages are rigid downwards in nominal 
terms (see recent studies by Holden and Wulfsberg, 2005, and Knoppik and Beissinger, 2005, which also include 
references to previous research). As shown by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) and Holden (1994), if inflation 
is pushed too low, downward nominal wage rigidity will result in higher wage pressure and higher equilibrium 
unemployment. One should recall that only a few years ago, the argument was made that the inflation target 
should be increased to 3 percent, to allow for more flexibility of relative wages. Overall, it is not clear what the  
appropriate target for the rate inflation is.  
 
NBW’s view:  
The current low rate of inflation does not imply that the inflation target should be reduced. The 
appropriate response to positive supply shocks is to stretch the horizon for reaching the inflation target, 
ensuring that monetary policy contributes to a stable development of the economy.  
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3.6 The new calibrated macromodel 
 
Norges Bank is currently developing a new, calibrated macroeconomic model (NEMO), 
to be used to support the interest rate setting of the Bank. A key motivation was to 
expand the Bank’s tool kit, making the Bank better equipped to conduct policy analyses. 
Furthermore, the Bank wanted to have a model in which the key properties were 
consistent with Norges Bank’s view of how monetary policy works. The new model is in 
line with those used by other inflation targeting central banks.  
 
Although NEMO is not fully developed, the current pilot version seems promising. There 
is good reason to believe that NEMO will prove useful to the Bank. However, the strong 
equilibrating mechanisms such models makes them less suitable to explain what happens 
in the economy if monetary policy does not work as expected. Thus, while analyses of 
robustness of the monetary policy undertaken within this model, as illustrated by the 
analyses based on the pilot version of the model in IR 3/04, clearly are useful, one can 
question whether such analyses really involve a test of the robustness of the monetary 
policy stance. There seems a clear risk that a model like NEMO will not reflect the real 
uncertainty that exists in the real world.  
 
It may be relevant to mention the large forecasting errors that Norges Bank has done 
when it comes to the rate of inflation, cf. charts 4.11-4.14. While it seems easy to 
understand that Norges Bank was not able to forecast the full effect of cheaper imports 
and higher productivity growth, the fact that the actual rate on inflation turned out to be 
so far outside the 90 percent confidence interval, clearly indicates that Norges Bank 
underestimated the uncertainty as to the future rate of inflation. 
 
This discussion underscores the importance of also making use of other types of 
information and analyses. One example is more traditional econometric approaches, see 
e.g. the inflation forecast made at the University of Oslo (Nymoen, 2005a,b). This 
approach has a strong advantage that it lends itself to proper evaluation of the forecasts, 
and comparison of different models. An entirely different perspective and type of 
information is provided by the regional network, as mentioned above.  
 
NBW’s view:  
The new calibrated macroeconomic model NEMO is likely to prove useful to the 
Bank. However, a model of this type may downplay the risks and uncertainties 
associated with monetary policy. Thus, it is crucial that the Bank supplements the 
analyses done in NEMO with other types of analyses and information, and that 
these other types of analyses and information also are taken into account in the 
decision making process.  It is our understanding that Norges Bank is aware of the 
importance of supplementing the NEMO with other types of information and 
analyses, in accordance with this view. 
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4 Monetary policy in 2001-2005      
 
There is strong evidence that monetary policy, viewed with the benefit of hindsight, 
was too tight in 2002 and early 2003, and possibly also in 2001. The tight monetary 
policy and strong krone at the time contributed to Norwegian firms increasingly 
expanding abroad. However, when Norges Bank started to act, the series of cuts in 
the interest rate since December 2002 seems an appropriate response to the 
situation.  
 
By raising interest rates after the 2002 wage negotiations Norges Bank 
demonstrated the consequences of too high wage growth with an inflation target.  
 
Was the final bout of rate cuts, from 2½% in October 2003 to 1¾% in March 2004 
necessary? On the one hand, they took place when the domestic economy already 
had turned the corner, confirmed by increasing demand, production and 
employment. On the other hand, core inflation continued to surprise on the 
downside, hitting a low of –0.1% in January 2004. Decisive action by Norges Bank 
may have helped to keep inflation expectations around the 2.5% target.  
 
In July 2004 the two-year horizon was abandoned in favour of a more flexible 
horizon of 1-3 years. The decision to stretch the horizon was a wise one. 
 
Current monetary policy is expansionary, with the folio rate at its lowest level since 
1816, and the real rate 1½-2½ percentage points below its assumed neutral level. 
The output gap is currently close to zero, and is expected to be positive for the next 
four years. In such a situation, monetary policy must avoid an excessive stimulation 
of the economy.  Too strong growth entails a risk for a renewed period with a too 
high interest rate, an appreciating krone and loss of competitiveness for the 
manufacturing enterprises. It is therefore comforting that Norges Bank’s Board in 
its latest strategy document (enclosed in IR 1/05) is signalling that rates will be 
raised towards normal levels over the next four-year period.  
 
 
4.1 The decisions 
Given the 2-3 years lag inherent for monetary policy to have full effect, it is appropriate 
to view developments in 2004 and into 2005 in light of decisions made 2-3 years earlier, 
i.e. from early 2001 on. However, as these decisions have been discussed thoroughly by 
previous NBWs, we will only deal with them in broad terms here.    
 
As Chart 4.1 shows, monetary policy remained fairly stable throughout 2001. At the 
outset of the year, the folio rate stood at 7.0% with a neutral bias. In late October, the bias 
was changed to easing, and rates were cut accordingly to 6.5% at the December meeting. 
In February 2002 the bank returned to a neutral stance. Following higher wage growth 
than foreseen, a tightening bias was approved May 22nd, and rates were hiked accordingly 
to 7.0% on July 3rd. In September, one returned to a neutral stance, replaced by a de facto 
easing stance in Governor Gjedrem's speech on December 3rd. 
 
Chart 4.1 illustrates the bias of the Bank: A tightening stance (darkly shaded areas), a 
neutral stance (shaded areas), and an easing stance (lightly shaded areas). As of July 1st 
2004, the traditional way of formulating the bias was abandoned.  
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In Chart 4.1, Norges Bank had a tightening stance in the darkly shaded areas, a neutral 
stance in the shaded ones, and an easing stance in the lightly shaded areas. With effect 
from July 1st 2004, the traditional way of formulating the bias was abandoned.  
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on December 12th, being followed by 50bp cuts on each of the three next meetings in 
2003. At a speech on June 3rd, Gjedrem stated that the Bank would "carefully consider
changing the interest rate in larger steps", followed by 100bp cuts at the next two 
meetings, thus bringing the folio rate down to 3.0% by August. In September, rate
cut again, to 2.5%, and Norges Bank returned to a neutral stance. This was maintained in 
October, but the Bank added that "After a period of very low inflation as we have now 
witnessed, it is appropriate to be particularly vigilant in monetary policy in the event that 
inflation does not increase as projected." Declining inflation and a stronger NOK led to 
rates being cut again in December, to 2.25%. An easing bias was again introduced. 
 
2
January and March. On both occasions, the folio rate was lowered by 25 bp. Since March 
2004 and until the time of writing, i.e. early April 2005, the folio rate has remained 
unchanged at 1,75%. 
 
T
Date Rate Bias 
28 4 E  -Jan-0 2.00 asing -9 -11 
11-Mar-04 1.75 Easing +14 +12 
21-Apr-04 1.75 Easing -3 -8 
26-May-04 1.75 Easing -4 -2 
1-Jul-04 
1  
1.75 Neutral* -7 -15 
1-Aug-04 1.75 Neutral* -2 +1 
22-Sep-04 1.75 Neutral* +8 +13 
3-Nov-04 1.75 Neutral* 0 -5 
15-Dec-04 1.75 Neutral* +3 -6 
2-Feb-05 1.75 Neutral*   
16-Mar-05 1.75 Neutral*   
*) ormulatio as abandon l: No clear al rnative to unchanged rates. Traditional f n of bi ed. Neutra te
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Throughout the first half of the year, the easing bias was formulated as before: 
"According to Norges Bank’s assessment, with a sight deposit rate of 1.75 per cent at 
present, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower than 2½ per cent is 
greater than the probability that it will be higher." 
 
However, from March 2004 on, the policy inclination was supplemented with a statement 
discussing an alternative policy:  
 
"As an alternative, the Executive Board has considered leaving the interest rate 
unchanged now and the possibility of keeping the interest rate low for a longer 
period. However, the Executive Board concluded that it is not appropriate – in the 
light of the decline in inflation – to deviate markedly from expectations in money 
and foreign exchange markets at present." 
 
This gave a hint that rates were close to bottoming out. When rates were kept unchanged 
in April, it was stated that 
 
"The Executive Board has considered two main alternatives: reducing the interest 
rate by 0.25 percentage point or keeping the interest rate unchanged at this time 
and awaiting additional information before any further reduction of the interest 
rate."  
 
The same was repeated in May and - with a slightly different wording - in July. By giving 
a fuller explanation of its stance, the Bank makes monetary policy more transparent, 
something which we approve of.  
 
Stretching the horizon 
With effect from July 1st 2004, three important steps were made. The horizon, up to this 
date communicated as exactly two years, was widened to 1-3 years. The Board's strategy 
document for the coming four-month period, up to this date published after the strategy 
period was over, was now published in advance. Reflecting the above, important changes 
were also made to the communication of the policy stance. 
 
When the inflation target was established in March 2001, Norges Bank stated (in 
Inflation Report 2/01, June 2001) that:  
 
"Norges Bank does not expect a change in interest rates to have an immediate 
effect on inflation. Different analyses indicate that a substantial share of the 
effects of an interest rate change occurs within two years. Two years is thus a 
reasonable time horizon for achieving the inflation target of 2½ per cent. If special 
circumstances prompt Norges Bank to apply a different time horizon than two 
years, the Bank will provide an assessment of this."  
 
In various wording, the two-year horizon survived for three years. In his speech in 
Gausdal January 23rd 2004, Deputy Governor Jarle Bergo said that: 
 
"Even though, according to the theory, the horizon should be variable, there are 
some advantages to maintaining a fairly firm horizon that have not been as 
prominent in the literature. It is crucial that the public and market participants 
understand how the central bank sets the interest rate in order to contribute to 
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confidence and credibility in monetary policy. According to the principle 
normally followed by Norges Bank, the interest rate is set with a view to 
achieving inflation of 2½ per cent at the two-year horizon. If it appears that 
inflation will be higher than 2.5 per cent, the interest rate will be increased. If it 
appears that inflation will be lower than 2.5 per cent, the interest rate will be 
lowered. This is a clear and simple interest rate setting principle to which the 
public and market participants can easily relate. This kind of simple principle also 
contributes to reducing uncertainty about the central bank’s trade-offs between 
price stability and stability in output and employment. We have no reason to 
believe that a variable horizon would generally result in substantially higher 
stability in inflation and output than a two-year horizon." 
 
With effect from July 1st 2004, the horizon was stretched to 1-3 years. Norges Bank  
stated on this occasion that:  
 
"The formulations as to the horizon for monetary policy have also been adjusted. 
The new wording reads as follows: Monetary policy influences the economy with 
long and variable lags. Norges Bank sets the interest rate with a view to stabilising 
inflation at the target within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 years. The 
more precise horizon will depend on disturbances to which the economy is 
exposed and how they will affect the path for inflation and the real economy 
ahead."  
 
Norges Bank added that "The new formulations better express the conduct of monetary 
policy."  
 
Several factors explain the stretching of the horizon. First, both NBW-04 and professor 
Lars E. O. Svensson had recommended that the apparently fixed two-year horizon should 
be softened. NBW-04 argued that "Norges Bank should abandon the current two-year 
targeting horizon". In his address at Norges Bank's Monetary Conference March 26th 
2004, professor Svensson said that Norges Bank should reduce its emphasis on the two-
year horizon, arguing that it was important that the whole forecasting path "looked good", 
and not only that the inflation was on target exactly two years ahead. What happens 
before and after the two-year point is also important.  
 
Second, by stretching the horizon, the central bank allows itself more flexibility when 
responding to shocks, cf. Faust & Henderson (2004). Third, new empirical analyses from 
the central bank indicated that changes in the exchange rate had a smaller and slower 
effect on CPI than previously assumed (IR 1/04). It would therefore be appropriate to 
have a somewhat longer horizon for the full effects to play themselves out. Fourth, in his 
speech in Gausdal January 23rd 2004, Deputy Governor Jarle Bergo said about the 
"normally" two-year horizon that: 
 
“According to theories on optimal monetary policy, the horizon should vary and 
partly depend on the size and duration of disturbances to the economy. For some 
types of disturbances, such as demand shocks, the optimal choice may be to 
achieve the inflation target relatively rapidly. For other types of disturbances, such 
as cost shocks, a longer horizon may be optimal, provided that confidence in 
monetary policy is not in jeopardy. “ 
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Three years earlier Bårdsen and Nymoen (2001) had argued along the same lines.  
The longer horizon solved a problem related to the immediate decision on interest rates. 
As the projections based in IR 2/04 showed, inflation would not reach its target in two 
years’ time without further rate cuts. At the same time other factors clearly pointed 
against further cuts. Both the global economy and the domestic economy had turned the 
corner. While labour market conditions still were slack and overall credit growth was 
seen as reasonable, the Bank expressed concern regarding the fact that rates were 
unusually low and that one did not have much experience with rate cuts this large over 
such a brief time period. 
 
Given Norges Bank's hitherto strict focus on the two-year horizon, it is no wonder that 
outside observers took the new formulation as a change of policy. The Bank, however, 
maintains that it was only a (slight) change of communication. The new formulation no 
doubt has given rise to changing expectations as to the future interest rate setting by 
Norges Bank. Before the new formulation of 1-3 years, one would expect the Bank to 
give priority to inflation at a two year horizon. With the new formulation agents in the 
financial market expect the Bank to be more flexible on when to revert to the 2.5 % 
inflation target. The change in formulation thus affects  observers’ policy expectations, 
impacting upon  the outcome of the policy. 
 
NBWs view:  
We approve of the decision to stretch the horizon to 1-3 years. A longer time horizon 
gives the Bank more flexibility when responding to shock, implying that stability of 
the economy can be given more weight. As the rationale for stretching out the 
horizon is both reasonable and clearly spelled out, the credibility of the inflation 
target should not be put in jeopardy. 
 
From July 2004 on, the traditional way of formulating the bias was abandoned and a 
much broader way of formulating the strategy took over. First, one maintained the 
wording of no "clear alternative", which may be understood as a near-term neutrality on 
interest rates. Second, one stated that "According to the Executive Board’s assessment, 
the inflation outlook may imply an unchanged interest rate for a longer period than 
implied by the interest rate assumptions in Inflation Report 2/04", which was a clear hint 
that forward rates were too high. Third, one published the Board’s Strategy Report for the 
coming four-month period for the first time, referring to the end-period interest rate 
interval (1¼-2¼%):  
 
"If the krone appreciates substantially, this may provide a basis for considering an 
interest rate at the lower end of, or below, the interval. The unusually low interest 
rate and uncertainty concerning the effects of previous monetary policy easing 
imply that we should exercise caution with regard to further interest rate 
reductions. On the other hand, given the prospect of low inflation ahead, wide 
deviations from projected economic developments would be required before it 
would be appropriate to increase the interest rate in the period to the beginning of 
November 2004."  
 
Fourth, one argued that "The prospect of continued low inflation in Norway also implies 
that Norway should not be the frontrunner when interest rates are increased in other 
countries”, indicating that developments in international interest rates would affect the 
speed of adjustment in Norwegian interest rates. 
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4.2 Evaluation of monetary policy in 2001 – 2003 
 
Due to the long lags of monetary policy, the interest rate setting in 2001 - 2003 still 
affects the Norwegian economy. Thus, there is reason to ask whether the recent 
development of the economy affects our evaluation of the monetary policy in 2001 – 
2003, as compared to previous evaluations, including earlier reports from Norges Bank 
Watch. When judging the quality of the monetary policy decisions, the most relevant type 
of evaluation is to focus on what would have been the appropriate policy in real time, i.e. 
with the information that was available to Norges Bank at the time. However, as this is 
done in previous evaluations, we will instead benefit from the additional information 
arising from the passage of time, by a brief ex post evaluation, discussing how one should 
view the monetary policy with the benefit of hindsight. Such an evaluation may 
contribute to our understanding of how monetary policy works.  
 
Chart 4.3 
stics Norway/DnB NOR Markets 
Chart 4.4 
stics Norway/DnB NOR Markets 
rom the current perspective and information, the combination of low inflation and 
as 
n the other hand, the series of cuts in the interest rate since December 2002 seems an 
lusion 
he rate of growth in wages in 2001 and 2002 needed to be reigned in (see Norges 
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F
negative output gap both in 2003 and 2004 is strong evidence that monetary policy h
been too tight. The strong krone in 2002 and early 2003 has probably been a key factor 
behind the increased expansion abroad of Norwegian firms (see NHO, 2004).  
 
O
appropriate response to the situation. The current healthy GDP-growth is partly a 
reflection of the low interest rate since mid 2003, hence it does not affect the conc
that the 2002 policy was too tight.  
 
T
Bank’s Annual Report 2003, page 45.). By taking action after the 2002 wage 
negotiations, Norges Bank made clear its “response function”. The current low
wage growth (spring 2005) suggests that  the experience of tight monetary policy in 2002
was one that wage setters do not want to see repeated; high wage growth leading to a high 
interest rate and a strong krone. However, one should also remember that there are self-
correcting mechanisms in the wage setting process, contributing to reduced wage growth
after years of high wage growth. Furthermore, the low rate of inflation implies that the 
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current real wage growth is fairly high relative to the conditions in the labour market. 
How wage negotiations work out with a relatively tight labour market in 2005 and 200
remain to be seen.  
 
6 
ccording to an estimated response function for Norges Bank based upon historical data 
his “further-
he fairly moderate downturn of the Norwegian economy in 2002 and 2003, as compared 
ing 
hart 4.5 Chart 4.6 
to say that a bit of luck also was involved; having 
e krone depreciating by 14 % from January 2003 to January 2004 on an effective 
ional 
gian 
he recent evolution of the Norwegian economy, in particular the current low rate 
onsistent with previous evaluations concluding that monetary policy 
A
interest rates were already too high by early 2002 (Bernhardsen and Bårdsen, 2004). 
Another hike in July 2002 would therefore bring rates further away from the 
“appropriate” level. Together with Norges Bank’s clear warning in advance, t
off-the-mark” action indicates that the central bank found it necessary to educate the 
social partners on the linkages between wage growth and interest rates.  
 
T
to previous downturns, can be taken as an indication of monetary policy being successful 
in engineering a soft landing. Yet this argument is questionable. The boom in the late 
1990s/early 2000s was much smaller than the boom in 1985-86, and so were the result
imbalances of the economy. Thus, it seems hard to argue that a sharp downturn was 
imminent in 2002, and that monetary policy worked to prevent it. 
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At the end of the day we think it is fair 
th
nominal basis suited the Norwegian economy perfectly well. However, it was far from a 
guaranteed outcome of the interest rate reductions enacted by Norges Bank. Internat
experiences abound when the effects of changes in the domestic interest rate fail to 
impact on the exchange rate in the desired manner. If the krone had remained strong for a 
longer period, inflation would have been even lower, and corporations in the Norwe
traded sector would have found themselves in a very troublesome situation.  
 
NBW’s view:  
T
of inflation, is c
was too tight in 2002. The tight monetary policy and strong krone at the time have 
probably contributed to Norwegian firms increasingly expanding abroad, but also 
to lower wage growth domestically. A more moderate rate of growth of wages is a 
key element behind the current low interest rate. The series of cuts in the interest 
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rate since December 2002 seems an appropriate response to the low inflation, stron
krone and negative output gap. 
   
  
g 
 Evaluation of monetary policy from late 2003 onwards 
med out and 
mployment was picking up. Also, the global economy was recovering, with particularly 
hart 4.8 
 
nk maintained a neutral stance in 003, but stated that monetary 
e “particularly vigila  pick up. When 
flation eventually declined further, the signal rate was again cut in three steps, from 
e 
of rate 
ting that interest rates should be 
creased to more normal levels. In contrast, inflation was expected to remain below 
es 
t 
4.3
 
By mid-2003 private consumption was increasing, housing prices had botto
e
strong demand for a number of Norwegian exports. The international recovery remained 
strong throughout the autumn of 2003 and first half of 2004, while the domestic upturn 
gained strength and breadth. Just one factor missed the mark: Inflation remained too low. 
By late 2003 core inflation was approaching zero. In addition to the persistent large 
negative drag from imported consumer goods, price inflation for domestically produced 
services slowed considerably (cf chart 4.7). 
 
Chart 4.7 C
Core inflation (CPI-ATE)
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05
Total Imports Other
Contribution to the decline in 
CPI-ATE inflation from Dec 
2001. Percentage points
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05
Imports Rents Other services Other
Source: Norges Bank Source: Norges Bank 
Norges Ba  October 2
policy would have to b nt” if inflation failed to
in
2½% in October to 1¾% in March 2004. From December 2003 to February 2004, th
import-weighted exchange rate (I-44) fell by close to 6%. At the outset a new bout 
cuts was unexpected by the market. However, at the final 25bp cut on March 11th the 
NOK had started to strengthen. As the reduction in Norges Bank’s signalling rate was 
expected, the strengthening of the NOK continued. 
 
Throughout 2004, Norges Bank was faced with conflicting objectives. Output gap was 
forecasted to be positive in the coming years, sugges
in
target, being an argument for low rates. By cutting interest rates this aggressively, 
continuing down to 1¾% from an already low level of 2½% five months earlier, Norg
Bank made it perfectly clear that fighting inflation was given high priority. But to wha
extent was a very low interest rate the appropriate response to low inflation?  
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BOX  4.1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGES IN THE INTEREST 
RATE DIFFERENTIAL AND IN THE EXCHANGE RATE 
 
In a speech on 7 June 2004 the Governor of Norges Bank said: “When there are prospects of moderate 
economic activity, low wage growth and low inflation, Norges Bank will reduce the interest rate. This will 
normally result in a depreciation of the krone.” 
 
When the domestic rate of interest unexpectedly is increased relative to the foreign rate, one normally 
expects an appreciation of the currency. Following Dornbusch’s seminal contribution in 1976, the exchange 
rate should overshoot so as to make room for an ensuing depreciation, on the assumption that uncovered 
interest rate parity holds. However, the issues are not settled, neither theoretically nor empirically, cf. the 
enormous literature on this topic (see e.g. Froot and Thaler 1990). 
 
In the scatter diagram below we have plotted changes in the one-month interbank interest rate differential 
between euro and kroner on the horizontal axis, and the changes in the exchange rate, measured as kroner 
per euro, on the vertical axis. The estimated line is negatively sloped, as expected, i.e. reducing the interest 
rate differential, makes for a weaker krone. Note that of the 47 observations, from April 2001 (when 
inflation target had been formally adopted) until February 2005, as many as 18 are in the “wrong” 
quadrants.  
 
However, there is the problem of simultaneity (see e.g. Bernhardsen and Bårdsen, 2004). Not only do 
changes in the interest rate impact upon the exchange rate; changes in the exchange rate may also have an 
effect on the interest rate (differential). When the krone gets stronger, inflationary pressures are reduced. If 
Norges Bank then decides to reduce the rate of interest, a scatter point is likely to appear in quadrant four. 
More generally, if Norges Bank’s reaction function is the dominant force, the estimated line in the diagram 
above will be upward sloping. 
Changes in the interest rate differential
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ormally a low interest rates leads to higher inflation via a weaker exchange rate. 
owever, the link between interest rate changes and exchange rate changes is not a 
raightforward one, see Box 4.1. In theory, all information should be contained in the 
rtant 
f 
N
H
st
exchange rate at a given point of time. Therefore, only unexpected changes to impo
variables, like current and future interest rate path, should affect the exchange rate. I
Norges Bank signals heavier cuts than anticipated by the market, the NOK should 
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immediately weaken, and then strengthen gradually, relative to the original forward path
Although the currency responds to a variety of surprises (or “news”), what happened w
broadly in line with theory, with a decline in the external value of the krone, follow
a strengthening from late February 2004 on. 
 
Significant interest rate differentials between Norway and EU12, and even more so 
between Norway and Japan through 2002 and
. 
as 
ed by 
 into 2003, also impacted upon unhedged 
apital flows from the retail segment. Some Norwegian households moved their mortgage 
ange 
gh 
particular via the effect of a 
ghter labour market on wage growth, one can question to what extent it was appropriate 
, 
 on the real economy. Higher productivity 
rowth and increased competition make production resources available for other 
d that: 
st rate 
period. However, the Executive Board concluded that it is not appropriate – in the 
y 
 
Given a
this low pply. The time for starting the process 
f measured increases now seems ripe. To avoid an undesired strengthening of the NOK, 
te around 1%, clearly below the assumed neutral level of 2½% to 
½%, monetary policy remains loose and will continue to stimulate the economy. 
ion 
ay increase by 4¼-4½% and offshore investments in the petroleum sector by close to 
c
loans into foreign currencies, possibly without fully understanding the inherent exch
rate risk. Conversely, European retail savers bought NOK-euro loans. Obviously, these 
types of non-professional “carry trades” lose their appeal when the interest rate 
differentials evaporate. When rates were cut in the first half of 2003, demand for foreign 
exchange loans dried up. Consequently, already at a folio rate of 2½%, the scope for 
further weakening of the NOK due to this effect was small. 
 
Lower interest rates will also increase inflation by pushing up domestic demand throu
lower borrowing costs. While this channel clearly works, in 
ti
to exploit this channel by cutting the rate of interest all the way down to 1.75 %. 
Domestic demand already grew quite briskly. Housing prices and household credit were 
growing at unsustainably high rates. Eventually, this would feed through into higher 
construction activity (as is currently the case).  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, low inflation in 2002-2004 was a supply-side phenomenon
with little reason to worry about adverse effects
g
purposes, but this was countered by the increased demand as alluded to above. 
Furthermore, inflation expectations seemed to be well anchored, see chart 3.1. In this 
light, the Board’s decision to cut rates from 2½% to 1¾% can not have been an 
uncontroversial one. Indeed, after the meeting on March 11th, Norges Bank state
 
"As an alternative, the Executive Board has considered leaving the intere
unchanged now and the possibility of keeping the interest rate low for a longer 
light of the decline in inflation – to deviate markedly from expectations in mone
and foreign exchange markets at present." 
 rate of interest at 1¾ % as of March 2005, for how long should the rate be kept at 
 level? The same considerations as above a
o
Norges Bank will have to use the communication channel intelligently and persuasively 
(more on this later). 
 
As the central bank Governor pointed out in his annual address of February 16th  2005, 
with a real interest ra
3
 
Looking at the average estimates from Norges Bank and Statistics Norway, domestic 
demand is expected to grow by almost 4 % in real terms in 2005. Private consumpt
m
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25%. The production gap is currently closing. Employment growth is expected to 
accelerate. Although low inflation will contain wage growth this year, a tighter labour 
market could put upward pressure on wages next year. Increased profitability may 
reinforce this. Already, domestic inflation is picking up, albeit quite slowly thus fa
 
If and when the interest rate is increased, a clear concern is whether the krone will 
appreciate. We believe that the risk is moderate, and that it to some extent can be affe
r. 
cted 
y Norges Bank's communication. By raising interest rates now, the risk that the 
duce 
ntials, 
et expects a one 
ercentage point lower interest rate differential next year, but a one percent higher 
 the 
th the 
imulus to 
orts the view that the interest 
te should be raised soon. 
ally abandoning the current expansionary monetary 
olicy as Norges Bank is signalling in the latest Inflation Report (IR 1/05). Norges 
ate should be hiked in a measured way, to await market reactions. 
the 
 
 
 
 
b
Norwegian economy is overheated in 2-3 years’ time is reduced. This should also re
the probability that Norges Bank will have to set high interest rate in the coming years. 
As the krone exchange rate is also affected by expected future interest rate differe
the effect of an interest rate hike now on the exchange rate is not clear. 
 
According to the theory of uncovered interest rate parity, the exchange rate depends on 
the cumulative expected future interest rate differential. If, say, the mark
p
interest rate differential in the following year, there will be no effect on the exchange rate. 
However, there may be reason to believe that the relationship is more complicated, in the 
sense that the effect of a change in the interest rate on the exchange rate depends on
size of the interest rate differential. Specifically, if the interest rate differential is small, 
transaction and information costs may prevent most foreigners from speculating in 
Norwegian kroner, implying that the exchange rate is insensitive to small changes in the 
interest rate. However, if the interest rate differential becomes sufficiently large, 
transaction and information costs become relatively less important, and foreign 
speculation may emerge. Then, a further increase in the interest rate may have large 
impact on the exchange rate. This hypothesis is consistent with the experience wi
strong krone in 2002-2003, when large interest-rate differentials gave a strong st
foreign currency borrowing by the domestic retail segment. 
 
If the hypothesis above is correct, the effect on the interest rate will be minimized by 
avoiding periods of high interest rate differentials. This supp
ra
 
NBW's view:  
The time is ripe for gradu
p
Bank’s signal r
Relevant and persuasive communication should be part of the action, reducing 
risk of a currency appreciation.  
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OX 4.2:  NORGES BANK’S CRITERIA  
 its Annual Reports, Norges Bank evaluates the monetary policy according to the following five criteria: 
as inflation close to the target of 2½ percent? What were the reasons for any deviations from the target? 
o what extent has the conduct of monetary policy increased the prospects for bringing inflation close to 
rget two years ahead? 
as the conduct of monetary policy contributed to stability in output and employment? 
• Has monetary policy underpinned confidence that future inflation will be 2½ percent? 
articipants? 
 of inflation is caused by factors that were difficult to foresee. More importantly, 
nomy out of 
flation up towards 
e target. The inflation forecast two years ahead remains below target, but this is reasonable in view of the 
The decisive interest rate cuts since 2002 contributed to a soft landing of the economy, after the difficult 
lated 
e targeted level. 
In
 
• W
• T
ta
• H
• Was monetary policy predictable for financial market p
 
What is NBW’s evaluation according to these criteria?  
 
• The inflation rate, adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy prices, was 0.3 percent in 2004, far 
below the 2.5 percent target. This seems to indicate failure, “big time”. Yet this is not our conclusion. To a 
large extent, the low rate
the low inflation rate is the result of mostly positive supply side shocks, not reflecting an eco
balance.  
 the Bank to push in• The very low interest rate during 2004 shows a determined effort by
th
current brisk growth of the Norwegian economy. 
• 
situation in 2002 and early 2003. The low interest rate during 2004, to get inflation back on track, stimu
an economy which already was growing quite briskly. The risk now is that the low interest rate gives rise to 
imbalances precipitating a future economic downturn. So far, the risk of such a development to unfold does 
not seem high. However, the situation calls for Norges Bank starting to increase its signalling rate sooner 
rather than later.  
• Inflation expectations five years ahead are close to the 2.5 percent target (see chart 3.1). The interest rate 
setting in 2003 and 2004 specifically and Norges Bank’s communication more generally, have contributed 
to keeping expectations of future inflation around th
• As we show in chapter 5, the Bank does occasionally surprise the market, but generally surprises are of 
minor nature and do not represent a large problem. sts  
 
id-term is a necessary in the conduct of 
monetary policy. It is hard to predict the future with great precision. However, the 
recasting process is valuable in itself. If done correctly, the process secures that the 
ttempted look into the future is reasonably consistent. Also, the process facilitates 
i ne fail? And why? Finally, setting numerical targets is also an 
r ges Banks communication with the outside world. 
e 
nd 
 
. 
 2003 hovered 
r the summer of 2003 
evised substantially up in October and 
 
4.4   Foreca
 
General 
Since changes in the interest rate affect the economy with a lag of 2-3 years, forecasting
economic developments over the short- to m
fo
a
learn ng: Where did o
impo tant part of Nor
 
In 2004 real GDP grew faster then forecasted… 
Charts 4.9-4.12 show the 2004 forecasts for Mainland GDP growth, unemployment, wag
growth and core inflation that were given by Norges Bank, Statistics Norway (SN), a
an average of independent forecasters ("Consensus") from early 2002 on. 
 
Mainland GDP grew by 3½ per cent last year, about 1¼ percentage point higher than
what was assumed by Norges Bank throughout 2002 and well into 2003, cf. chart 4.9
(Typically, both Norges Bank's and Statistics Norway's estimates through
around the estimated long-term trend.) After further rate cuts ove
and higher growth globally, estimated growth was r
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further going into 2004. As chart 4.9 shows, Statistics Norway was quicker in revising 
their growth estimates upwards, while the consensus average lagged. Also, throughout 
2003 Statistics Norway forecasted the 2004 unemployment level more correctly, while 
orges Bank was slower in adjusting down their estimates, despite publishing after 
ly 
 2004, Norges Bank’s big forecasting error was 
intained in the Inflation Report of October the same year. 
what earlier than Norges Bank in adjusting down 
ates from the two institutions differed quite 
broadly similar, with the most noteworthy 
e t quarter. While Statistics Norway 
rg e 
tter closer to the final outcome of 0.3%. 
Source: NB,SN,CF,DnB NOR Markets 
art 4.12 
Source: NB,SN,CF,DnB NOR Markets 
 
 
N
Statistics Norway. 
 
Chart 4.9 Chart 4.10 
Source: NB,SN,CF,DnB NOR Markets Source: NB,SN,CF,DnB NOR Markets 
 
 
… but wages and prices grew more slow
In terms of wage growth and inflation in
made in June 2002 and ma
Although Statistics Norway was some
their estimates, throughout 2003 estim
modestly. Well into the year, forecasts were 
difference being the inflation estimates giv n in the firs
expected 1.0% core inflation in 2004, No es Bank expected 0.5% core inflation, th
la
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The importance of independent forecasting 
NBW-04 stated that Norges Bank should both cross-check their forecasts with other 
structural forecasters and explore the possible causes if projections differ substantially. In 
particular, one should make projections conditional on key determinants where 
assumptions regarding these differ. While we share this view, especially as regards the 
need to explore different outcomes given alternative assumptions, a key problem is that 
there are but three “structural” forecasters in Norway; the Ministry of Finance, Statistics 
Norway, and Norges Bank itself. 
 
While one of these, the Ministry of Finance, has a very thorough forecasting process, 
incorporating exclusive information, e.g. from the ongoing budget process as well as 
specially gathered facts and forecasts from other ministries and public institutions, it only 
revises its forecasts twice a year. Furthermore, while the bulk of the forecasts are to be 
ecasts of som  by the 
olicy significance of the forecast itself.  
 Bank should pay attention to what this 
lds. 
 obvious 
 
er issue: The lack of structural forecasters that may 
rovide Norges Bank with proper benchmarks for its own forecasting. Norges Bank 
e 
f 
cern whether the quality can be maintained in 
e future. With the exception of the Ministry of Finance, no other institution has a 
tics Norway allocate enough  resources on forecasting and 
nalysing the development of the Norwegian economy. 
in. In 
 
considered as best guesses, for e key variables might be affected
p
 
Statistics Norway is another contender. Norges
institution comes up with when looking into the crystal ball telling what the future ho
Thus, large forecasting discrepancies is a strong reason for closer scrutiny of one owns 
forecasts, However, when structural shifts/supply-side shocks take place it is not
to what extent one forecaster (Norges Bank) should adopt the view of another forecaster
(Statistics Norway).  
 
This whole discussion raises anoth
p
claims to have 10-15 man-years engaged in the process of making forecasts for the 
Norwegian economy, to assist monetary policy decisions. Two thirds of these are 
primarily oriented towards judging the current situation. In comparison, Statistics 
Norway allocates less than 5 man-years (Kvarts +KT) to working on the same issues. Th
modest amount of resources in Statistics Norway employed in forecasting has paid of
quite handsomely. However, there is a con
th
structural, model-based forecasting process.  
 
NBW’s view:  
The large forecasting errors illustrate the need for at least two forecasters with 
sufficient resources to do proper and independent forecasts. It is therefore 
important that Statis
a
 
 
Consistently overestimating the rate of inflation 
In 2003 and again in 2004, Norges Bank missed its inflation target by a wide marg
2003 core inflation turned out at 1.1%, in 2004 at 0.3%. As the two charts below shows, 
Norges Bank has, since the inflation target was established, consistently overestimated 
inflation 2-3 years ahead. In IR 2/01 (June 2001), Norges Bank estimated core inflation to
2½% in 2003. It ended up at 1.1%. In IR 1/02 (March 2002) core inflation was estimated 
at 2½% in 2004. The outcome was 0.3%.  
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Chart 4.13 
Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets 
Chart 4.14 
Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets 
indicating the probabilities attached to various outcom
uncertainty increases the further out in tim
representative – of the 14 pr r 
the years, the ones from IR 1/02 and IR 1/03. (O ilar 
magnitude.) Both show that inflation not onl
margin. The projections also missed the 90% 
around the central forecast.  
 
 
 
Chart 4.15 
OR Markets
Chart 4.16 
Source: Norges Bank, DnB NOR Markets
bove, we have seen that Statistics Norway to a large extent made similar errors. 
eems, was hit by a “once in a c e, with a negative inflation shock 
that was larger than anything likely to occur in the next decades. However, the “once in a 
century”-wave explanation is unlikely, and we conclude that the real uncertainty 
associated with the inflation forecast was much higher than the impression readers get 
from looking at the fan chart. 
 
 
Since IR 4/00 Norges Bank has presented its forecasts for core inflation with a fan chart 
es. As the charts below show, 
e one goes We have selected two – quite 
ojection paths being presented in the Inflation Reports ove
ther projections show errors of a sim
y undershot the central projection by a wide 
interval, in broad terms the +/- 1 %-point 
Source: Norges Bank, DnB N
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Norges Bank has gone some way in addressing this issue, as the 90% variation band on 
1.7 %-points) than it was in, e.g. IR 1/03 (1.2 
nd had been applied in 2003, one would mis
unavoidable. In an unpublished
 that Norges Banks fan-charts are too 
recasts. Furthermore, Nymoen argues th
t to the shocks once they have occurred, 
the official forecasts. Thus, according to 
ely avoidable. 
the three-year horizon, is wider in IR 1/05 (
%-points). However, even if the wider ba s 
actual inflation in 2004 by a wide margin.  
 
Another issue is whether the forecast errors really were  
paper, professor Ragnar Nymoen (2004) finds
narrow, giving an illusion of very precise fo at a 
simple econometric model is able to adap
improving the forecast properties relative to 
Nymoen Norges Bank's forecast failure was larg
 
ith 
 by 
e year.  
ng 
ore 
ainland investments. 
is cooling of the domestic economy takes place despite a much looser 
NBW’s view:  
orges Bank’s fan charts seem to underesN timate the real uncertainty associated w
the inflation forecasts. To what extent forecast errors could have been smaller
use of other methods, remains unsettled. A proper evaluation and comparison of the 
various forecasts and the reason for their large deviations from the later observed 
values of the relevant variables  would be useful, both when it comes to improving 
the forecasts, and when assessing the uncertainty associated with the forecasts. 
 
 
Looking ahead 
As regards Mainland Norway’s GDP growth in 2005, Norges Bank foresaw the shift to 
above trend growth half a year before Statistics Norway. By June 2003 Norges Bank 
expected Mainland GDP growth of 3% in 2005, cf. chart 4.17, while Statistics Norway 
id not adjust its estimate up to 3% before December the samd
 
Currently there is no significant difference between the two as regards expected growth in 
2005. For 2006 and 2007, Statistics Norway has a more pronounced cyclical slowdown 
than Norges Bank, i.e. ½-¾ percentage points lower Mainland growth both years. 
Statistics Norway expects a much more marked global slowdown going forward, leadi
to a slowing of growth in Norwegian exports. Furthermore, Statistics Norway has a m
arked decline in offshore investments. The same applies to mm
Interestingly, th
monetary policy in Statistics Norway's latest forecasts. In 2006 and 2007, Norges Bank 
expects the money market interest rate to be, respectively, about ¾ and 1¾ percentage 
points higher than Statistics Norway does.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 N O R G E S  B A N K  W A T C H  -  2 0 0 5  
Chart 4.17 Chart 4.18 
Source: Norges Bank, DnB NOR Markets Source: Statistics Norway,DnB NOR Markets 
he differences in growth estimates affect the two institutions' view of the labour market 
evelopments. While both expect unemployment to bottom out in 2006, Norges Bank 
ssumes unemployment to be about ¼ percentage point lower than Statistics Norway in 
006 and close to ½ percentage point lower in 2007, cf. charts 4.19 and 4.20. For 2005, 
eir estimates of average unemployment are roughly similar. 
 
ource: Norges Bank, NOR Markets Source: Statistics Norway, DnB NOR Markets 
s less worried about a 
ght(er) labour market now than earlier. With lower unemployment and higher inflation 
oing forward, Norges Bank expects wage growth to pick up somewhat. This is a view 
s Norway does not share, as th wth estimates remain well below 
4%, cf. chart 4.22, consistent with higher unemployment than Norges Bank foresees.  
 
 
 
T
d
a
2
th
 
Chart 4.19 
S
Chart 4.20 
 
 
Norges Bank's view of likely wage growth in 2005 has changed considerably since mid-
2003. Then, one expected an unemployment rate of 4¾% to yield a wage growth of 5% 
(2½% in real terms). Now, an unemployment rate of 4% is expected to give a wage 
growth of 4% (2¾% in real terms). Clearly, Norges Bank seem
ti
g
that Statistic eir wage gro
Mainland GDP, y/y in per cent
Norges Bank's estimates
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1.0
1.5
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05
2005 2006 2007 2008
Mainland GDP, y/y in per cent
Statistics Norway's estimates
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1.0
1.5
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05
2005 2006 2007
Unemployment rate, per cent
Norges Bank's estimates
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
Jan-04 Jan-05Jan-03
2005 2006 2007 2008
Unemployment rate, per cent
Statistics Norway's estimates
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
Jan-04 Jan-05Jan-03
2005 2006 2007
49 
 N O R G E S  B A N K  W A T C H  -  2 0 0 5  
 
Chart 4.21 
Source: Norges Bank, NOR Markets Source: Statistics Norway, DnB NOR Markets 
 view 
irst, what would be the effects of applying the interest rate assumptions that Statistics 
orway is basing their forecasts on? Second, is Norges Bank underestimating the 
likelihood of a more marked global slowdown some years ahead? Third, since Statistics 
inflationary impulses that Norges Bank has 
Statistics Norway is proven right abou
appropriate monetary policy response? 
 
 
Chart 4.23 Chart 4.24 
Chart 4.22 
Norway is expecting the same inflation with lower wage growth, are there some 
not taken fully into account? Finally, if 
t the domestic slowing, what would be the 
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Norges Bank's estimates
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What is puzzling, however, is that the two institutions differ only marginally in their
of expected core rate of inflation, cf. charts 4.23 and 4.24. In 2006 the difference is 
currently ¼ percentage point, in 2007 close to zero. While the spill-over from wages is 
slow, we would expect to see some effects of different wage growth forecasts by 2007. 
For Norges Bank, the above are factors that may need further exploration.  
 
F
N
Source: Norges Bank, NOR Markets Source: Statistics Norway, DnB NOR Markets 
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5 Communication 
 
In NBW’s view Norges Bank is doing a good job in informing the market and th
public at large. Communication has been continuously improved over the year
Inflation Report, in particular, contains much information that helps to enligh
e markets' understanding of the con
e 
s. The 
ten 
duct of monetary policy. The decision to 
ublish the Board's strategy Report for the forthcoming strategy period in the 
2004 to be a significant change. However, 
indicates that communication still 
 
If monetary policy is fully transparent, 
changes should be small, as the market w
information becoming available. After four y
continues to surprise. However, this do
transparency. 
 
The practice of announcing important shifts in
after ordinary Board meetings should be
nnounced at a press conferen g an ordinary or extraordinary 
mportant c h also 
 extent the Board was involved in the decisions. 
orges Bank is taking further steps towards applying an optimal interest rate path, 
 We approve of this practice, not least because it implies 
t biased. This has not always been the case in the past. 
 the Storting meet the 
ng 
 not a 
Bank’s transparency is limited by information that may have detrimental 
ffects on the decision making process itself within the Bank. As Otmar Issing, chief 
, 
th
p
Inflation Report, has further improved communication. 
 
Norges Bank does not consider the stretching of the horizon to 1-3 years in July 
external observers do. This discrepancy 
leaves something to be desired.  
market reactions to actual interest rate 
ould respond continuously to new 
ears of inflation targeting Norges Bank 
es not reflect any significant lack of 
 monetary policy in speeches and not 
 discontinued. Important policy changes 
should be a ce, followin
Board meeting. The fact that i
aises the question of to what
hanges were announced in a speec
r
 
N
as NBW-04 recommended.
ha  the forecasts will be unt
 
Norges Bank has taken an active approach in communicating with the academic 
community and with the public at large. It is important that researchers in the Bank 
are free to engage in scientific debates with fellow researchers outside the Bank. 
 
Norges Bank is doing a good job in communicating the objectives and plans of 
monetary policy with the social partners. The hearings in
expectations of the politicians. Norges Bank should acknowledge that it is pursui
inflation targeting more flexibly now than in the early days. 
 
 
5.1 General Observations 
 
An integral part in the behaviour of an inflation targeting central bank is a strong 
emphasis on communication. However, the postulate of absolute transparency is
viable one. The 
e
economist of the ECB, puts it: “Transparency is not an end in itself; a central bank is not 
established with the primary objective of communicating with the public.” (Issing 2005
p. 68) 
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We would like to put forward five reasons in favour of an open and transparent central 
ank 
n 
. Bernanke, "…as public servants whose decisions affect the lives of every citizen, 
e 
arent 
ns of 
 
xpectations, changes in the nominal interest rate are likely to have stronger impact on 
hird, as Faust and Henderson argue (2004, p. 122), “what constitutes optimal policy is 
 
ment of best practice monetary policy.  
e 
f short-run opportunism. Thus, as emphasized by Faust and Henderson (2004), 
roper central bank communication can be seen as an enforcement mechanism based on 
 is transparent, consistent and precise, each monetary 
ay ask market participants about their view on the Bank's 
 
b
 
First, the central bank has an obligation to the public to communicate its objectives and 
plans in the most open way possible. In the words of US Federal Reserve Governor Be
S
central bankers have a responsibility to provide the public as much explanation of thos
decisions as possible, so long as doing so does not compromise the decision making 
process itself." (Bernanke 2004) 
 
Second, by communicating its objectives and pursuing them in a coherent and transp
manner, a central bank may contribute to anchoring the public's long-term expectatio
the rate of inflation. A positive inflation shock will then only have moderate influence on
the future trajectory of the general price level, wage demands will not factor in higher 
flation, and a wage price spiral may be avoided. Also, with stable inflation in
e
the real economy. 
 
T
inextricably linked with public expectations about policy”, the point being that one
cannot know how a policy measure, say, a change in the interest rate, will affect the 
economy without taking expectations into account. 
 
Fourth, by communicating openly, the bank will also stimulate the debate about how 
monetary policy is conducted and engage others in the public discourse on the 
develop
 
Finally, the central bank, by communicating clearly its plans and objectives, increases th
cost o
p
policymakers aversion to criticism. 
 
 
5.2 Communicating with the market 
 
 Norges Bank’s communicationIf
decision should be regarded as a consequence of objectives, plans and forecasts 
communicated at earlier stages; the Bank's explanation of its response function; and all 
new "external" information since the last decision. To put it differently, only genuinely 
new information on economic developments since the last Board meeting should have an 
impact on the interest rate decisions.  
 
There are three ways to evaluate the quality of Norges Bank's communication with the 
arket. First, one mm
communication. Second, one may look at analysts' forecasts in advance of the meetings 
vs the actual outcome. Third, one may look at movements in market prices following the
publication of the decision. If the decision is anticipated, market reactions should be 
muted. If not, Norges Bank has surprised the market. 
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In general, agents in the financial markets think highly of the performance of Norges 
y 
aken by 
s expected, Norges Bank moves the markets 
ne way to investigate the transparency of Norges Bank is to look at the change in key 
speech by the central bank Governor or 
e Deputy Governor. Table 4.1 presents the average daily changes in five such variables 
s and, for that matter, in the exchange rate. 
Bank and regard the Bank as a relatively clear communicator, where future actions ma
be predicted with some certainty. That is not to say that these agents never are t
surprise, as is elaborated in the following. 
 
The biannual meetings that Norges Bank arranges with chief economists work well. The 
opportunity to offer Norges Bank advice on its communication strategy is highly 
appreciated. 
 
A
O
financial variables after a rate decision or a key 
th
– the three month money market rate, the one- and two year interest rate swaps, the 10 
year Government bond rate and the trade-weighted exchange rate (TWI). Instead of 
looking solely at the domestic rate changes, we have chosen to study changes in the 
interest rate differentials vis-a-vis Euro interest rates, thus excluding any substantial 
changes in international interest rates due to external forces. If the change (or lack of 
change) in the folio rate was expected by the market, one would expect only minor 
hanges in the interest rate differentialc
 
 
 
Table  5.1  Daily changes in key financial variables (average absolute values) 
 3m diff, bp 1y diff, bp 2y diff, bp 10y diff, bp TWI, % 
 events all events all events all events all events all 
1999 15 4 9 4 10 4 4 3 0.1 0.2
2000 6 2 4 3 4 4 3 2 0.2 0.2
2001 6 3 9 4 9 4 2 2 0.2 0.2
2002 12 3 12 4 10 4 3 3 0.2 0.2
2003 12 13 17 4 18 5 9 4 0.5 0.3
2004 4 1 6 3 7 3 4 3 0.3 0.3
2005 3 1 8 2 12 3 6 2 0.4 0.3
Avg. 9 3 10 4 10 4 4 3 0.3 0.2
Source: Datastream/DnB NOR Markets. Events indicate days with interest rate decision or key speech, 
while all indicate all other days. 
 
nsurprisingU ly, the data referred in the table show that market prices move more on (or 
verage, the spread between Norwegian 
 
 rate, 
ay 
 
terest rate differentials. The charts below show the absolute value of the changes in 
asis points (bp) in the folio interest rate on each rate meeting (a large part of the 
after) interest rate meetings or key speeches. On a
3m-, 1y- and 2y-interest rates and their European counterparts move by 3-4 bp on a daily
basis. On the days where events take place, they move by 9-10 bp. Interestingly, there is 
no discernible effect on the 10-year Government bond rate or the trade-weighted 
exchange rate. (The same applies to the EURNOK-rate.) 
 
Over the last six years, one year stands out; 2003 saw the largest changes in the folio
and also the largest changes in interest rates after meetings or speeches. While 2004 m
be termed "eventless", Norges Bank managed to move the markets more than it did in
similarly eventless 2001. 
 
 the discussion that follows, we limit the study to changes in the one- and two-year In
in
b
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observations are zero), and the absolute value of the corresponding (same-day) changes in 
e one- ar int iffer inst s zone i tes (red 
. A 20 m av  att i d. I  th  
ngs, ave luded market reactions to a sm ll num er of significant speeches. 
 
irst o vati n the arts b ow is nuary th 1999, when the folio rate was cut 
8.0 % 7.5% .e. an solute hang
st spre  vis-à is th ro zo  was 6 bp, clinin to 328  the  aft
p, indicating that no cut was expected at this particular meeting.)  
 
 
nges 
 Markets 
001 
to cut rates in the 
ftermath of the terrorist attack in New York and Washington DC on September 11. 
th and two-ye erest rate d entials aga imilar euro nterest ra
dots) lso, a 
w
-day oving erage of the l er is d splaye n addition to e rate
meeti e h inc a b
 
1999
The f bser on i  ch el  Ja  27
from to  (i ab  c e of 50 bp). Before the rate cut, the one-year 
intere ad -v e eu ne  34 de g  bp  day er. 
Thus, the spread narrowed by 18 bp, as the chart shows. Similarly, the 2-year spread 
narrowed by 24 bp. (The one-month interest rate differential declined by as much as 75 
b
 
Markets were surprised, but less so, when the next 50 bp cut was taken on March 3rd. The
one-month rate fell by 35 bp, while the one- and two-year interest rate differentials fell by
16 and 13 bp, respectively. When rates were cut by 50 bp again in April and in June, the 
interest rate differentials hardly moved at all, indicating that these interest rate cha
were close to being fully expected by the market.  
 
The next surprise came when rates remained unchanged in August the same year, after 
four consecutive cuts of 50bp each. Interest rate differentials rose 15-20 bp. When rates 
were cut again in September, market rates fell, though less this time. 
 
 
Chart 5.1 Chart 5.2 
Source: Datastream/DnB NOR Markets Source: Datastream/DnB NOR
 
 
2000 
In 2000, the only notable surprise came when Norges Bank in September hiked the folio 
rate from 6.75% to 7.00% and simultaneously assumed a neutral stance going forward. 
 
2
In 2001, Governor Svein Gjedrem’s upbeat annual address on February 15th caused the 
one-year interest rate differential to increase by some 15 bp. The second time Norges 
Bank took the market by surprise that year was when the Bank failed 
a
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d/d in bp vs euro 2y. Absolute value
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Following the non-action of the September 19th meeting, the interest rate differential 
increased by 30bp.  
uncertainty there is no point in applying the 
and see attitude. The market was again surpri
50 bp on December 12th, with the interest rate dif
 
 
Chart 5.3 
 Datastream/DnB NOR Markets 
Chart 5.4 
Source: Datastream/DnB NOR Markets 
k 
 on July 3rd, responded by increasing the interest rate differential by 
e 
ghtening to neutral at the September meeting, the 2-year interest rate differential peaked 
tober. Keeping a neutral stance arket 
n Norges Bank’ ained bullish on the outlook. 
When the Bank finally changed its mind, it again took markets by surprise. Gjedrem’s 
speech on December 3rd for Sparebanken Nord-Norge contained the coded message “A 
preliminary assessment of some new aspects of economic developments is also 
presented.”, after which followed a more cautious description of the economic situation. 
Rates fell 15-20bp the following day. Despite this hidden warning, market actors were 
still confused about the next step. When the Bank cut 50bp on December 11th and 
signaled further cuts, rates fell 10-20 bp. 
 
2003 
Again in 2003, Gjedrem’s annual address, on February 20th, managed to move the 
markets. By stating that “If the world economy experiences prolonged stagnation and the 
 
NBW-03 was quite critical of Norges Bank's lack of action after 9/11. With additive 
Brainard principle of gradualism and a wait 
sed when Norges Bank finally cut rates by 
ferential being reduced by 10-15 bp. 
2001-02: Change in folio and 1y
d/d in bp vs euro 2y. Absolute value
20
40
80
100
Source:
 
 
2002 
Following wage negotiations indicating higher wage growth than expected, Norges Ban
on May 22nd 2002 shifted from a neutral to a tightening stance, indicating that rates 
would have to increase going forward. Market actors, expecting higher rates at the 
orthcoming meetingf
15-20bp. A smaller reaction came to the actual 50bp hike at the July meeting, when th
interest rate differential moved another 10-15 bp. 
 
Over the summer it became apparent that Norway was increasingly affected by the 
ngoing slowdown in global economic activity. Following a shift in stance from o
ti
in early Oc
reaction. Throughout the autum
in October caused no significant m
s rhetoric rem
0
Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03
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krone remains firm, a markedly lower intere
krone and mitigate the effects for Norway.... A 
thus seem appropriate”, the Governor reinfor te 
cuts. The interest rate differential fell 35 bp th
two cuts, to 5½% in March and to 5%
 
The next big surprise came at the CME-m
applied a coded message: “An assessment
developments is also presented.”  This statem
“Growth in Norway is likely to be fairly w
inflation is likely to remain below target 
policy will therefore continue. Norges Bank'
consider changing the interest rate in large
OX 5.1: THE POWER OF COMMUNICATION 
kened against the euro. In the course of half an 
er to 7.94 kroner – half of this increase in a few 
st rate will contribute to a weakening of the 
gradual easing of monetary policy would 
ced expectations of further substantial ra
e following day. After that, none of the next 
 in April moved the markets much. 
eeting on June 3rd, where Gjedrem again 
 of some new aspects of economic 
ent was followed by the formulation 
eak now, and with an unchanged interest rate, 
in the period ahead. The easing of monetary 
s Executive Board will also carefully 
r steps.”  
 
 
B
 
At 11 o’clock in the morning on June 3, the Governor of Norges Bank gave a speech at a CME-seminar. At 
11 a.m. the speech was put out on the web. At the very beginning Mr. Gjedrem announced that “Norges 
Bank's Executive Board will also carefully consider changing the interest rate in larger steps.” This 
statement was taken as an indication that the next interest rate reduction in late June could be one whole 
percentage point, i.e. a reduction from 5 % to 4 %. 
 
The graph below shows that the krone immediately was wea
our, the price of the euro rose substantially, from 7.88 kronh
minutes time. Through the day the weakening of the krone continued. 
Price of euro in terms of kroner on 3 June 2003  
 
 
Six months NIBOR fell from 4.46% on 3 June to 4.16% the next day, and down to 3.88% on 5 June.
Through clever communication – with all participants in the financial market receiving the sa
information at the same time – Norges Bank was able to change market prices, i.e. interest rates and
exchange rate, substantially. And, mind you, without actually doing anything with the signal rate until a 
good three weeks later. 
 
me 
 the 
Source : Reuters 
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On June 25th rates were cut from 5% to 4%, the hitherto largest single step under 
king larger steps in interest rate adjustments" and “ Given this outlook, there may also 
ently implied by expectations 
 money and foreign exchange markets." Despite being warned in advance, market rates 
5bp. The next two outcomes – a cut to 2½% and return to a neutral stance in September 
a shift to an easing bias, 
 an easing bias after the preceding meeting, 
the m n taken by surprise. Spreads fell 25bp on that day. 
 
Source: Datastream/DnB NOR Markets 
Chart 5.6 
Source: Datastream/DnB NOR Markets 
he two 25bp cuts in January and March was expected and caused little change in market 
ng 
ds picked up somewhat. At the next two meetings this 
ance was maintained, and market reactions were muted. 
Gjedrem’s rule. The easing bias was maintained and Norges Bank added that it “... is now 
ta
be a basis for an easing of monetary policy further than curr
in
again fell, this time by 30-40bp. 
 
When rates again were cut by 100bp, from 4% to 3% at the next meeting, market 
reactions were much more muted, with spreads against euro rates declining by just 10-
1
and no change in October - were largely expected and caused little reaction. 
 
When rates were cut again to 2¼% on December 17th with 
without any explicit warning in the shape of
arket was agai
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2004 
Compared with the preceding 2-3 years monetary policy was fairly stable in 2004 and 
surprises were few.  
 
T
expectations. When the Bank left rates unchanged in April and maintained its easi
stance, and repeated this in May, neither affected the market to any significant degree. 
 
In July the Bank declared that calculations based upon current forward rates gave too low 
inflation going forward (IR 2/04). Accordingly, 2-year spreads fell 15 bp, 1-year spreads 
less. The same assessment in August gave no reaction, but when wording became more 
eutral again in September, sprean
st
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2005 
The meeting on February 2nd maintained the wording from the preceding meeting, bar a 
minor twist regarding the possibility for further cuts, stating that they now were "less 
kely". In mid-December the Bank said "it would exercise caution with regard to further 
f key sentences 
pplied in previous post-meeting press statements were modified. Gjedrem stated that "It 
as been important to prevent inflation expectations from falling and becoming 
ntrenched at a low level", that "we have kept interest rates low for a longer period" and 
that "Norway has lagged behind other countries in adjusting interest rates to a more 
lag behind other countries in setting interes ore, 
the Governor stated that the folio rate was at
was below its assumed neutral level, and that nd 
going forward.  
 
Markets responded immediately. The following da
differentials rose 15 bp and 23 bp, respectivel
December 2002 and June 2003 speeches, m
would not wait long before acting. Over the c o-
year differentials rose another 29 bp and 13 
Norway showing good growth 
 
statement following the March 1 , by not following up on the 
e market  no 
lternatives that could have indicated that rates were to be hiked soon. The interest rate 
terval at the end of the four-month strategy period was lifted from 1¼%-2¼% to 1½%-
but it was at the press conference explicitly stated that one should not interpret this 
 
ne wanted to maintain the width of the band as before. Both the one- 
nd two-year interest rate differentials fell on the news, by 7 bp and 11 bp, respectively. 
n a number of occasions Norges Bank has taken the market by surprise. Monetary 
ange in folio rate or 
ommunicating that markets have gotten important forward prices wrong, as Norges 
ees it) may be innocuous. However, it is the accumulated set of events that makes 
 
he above historical description shows that the Bank has, on a number of occasions, 
surprised the market. This typically happens when Norges Bank changes its 
li
interest rate reductions." Markets did not react to this. 
 
In Governor Svein Gjedrem's annual address February 17th, a number o
a
h
e
normal level." After the Board meeting two weeks earlier, it was stated that "…we should 
t rates at a more normal level." Furtherm
 its lowest level since 1816, that the real rate 
 this would continue to stimulate dema
y the one- and two-year interest rate 
y. In light of the experiences with the 
arkets were concerned that Norges Bank 
ourse of the next month, the one- and tw
bp, partly fuelled by data from Statistics 
in the second half of 2004. 
The press 6th meeting
Governor’s annual speech, took th  by surprise. Norges Bank flagged
a
in
2½%, 
as a higher central value. Rather, it reflected that the previous low end now was seen as
less likely, and that o
a
 
 
The bank has surprised – and will do it again 
O
policy void of surprises is not possible in practice. New information arrives continuously, 
and our understanding of how important economic variables affect each other is 
developing over time. Quite often a gradual change in the economic outlook, including 
the expected rate of inflation, takes place. New pieces of information accumulate. The 
last piece of information making for a change in policy (ch
c
Bank s
the bank move. And this accumulation over time of how the Bank perceives the situation
and the likely future path of the economy can not be communicated on a continuous 
basis.  
 
T
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direction/bias. It is difficult to see how this may be avoided given the fact that Norges 
Bank’s communication is – and has to be – discretionary. A continuous dissemination 
and weighting of new information, dispersed to the market is impossible, since m
the information is imprecise and uncertain. Also, if the bank changes its view every 
fortnight according to shifting winds in the global and domestic economy, we believ
communication will be less transparent. The best way to communicate the Bank’s view of 
the future is therefore by well-researched and thorough analyses. Given the fact that 
forecasts are uncertain and personal judgements thus play an important role, it is hardly 
surprising that one cannot forecast with precision to what extent Norges Bank’s views 
will change from
uch of 
e 
 meeting to meeting.  
ferential vis-à-vis Euro rates to 
xclude any effects of changes in international rates. (Data for Norway differ slightly 
 the 
ariation. 
 
 
More surprises from Norges Bank than from other European central banks 
That being said, empirical evidence seems to indicate that Norges Bank surprises the 
markets more than what other central banks do. In table 5.2, we compare the average 
changes in the one year swap rate after a monetary policy meeting. For Norway and 
Sweden we look at changes in the one-year interest rate dif
e
from those presented in table 5.1, as changes following key speeches are omitted in
table below.) 
 
Norwegian interest rates vary on a daily basis slightly more than rates in the three other 
countries, which must be seen in light of the large overall variations in Norwegian short-
term rates over the last six years. Norway also has the largest changes in one-year rates 
after meetings, and the largest ratio of post-meeting changes to overall daily changes. 
Measured in this way, Sweden and UK comes second, and EU12 enjoys the lowest 
v
 
 
Table 5.2   Market reactions to interest rate meetings. Daily change in one-year 
interest rate, measured in basis points (absolute values)* 
 EU12 United Kingdom Sweden Norway 
 meetings all meetings all meetings All meetings all 
1999 3 2 8 3 3 3 9 4
2000 3 2 3 2 6 3 4 3
2001 4 3 6 4 5 3 8 4
2002 3 2 4 3 4 3 11 4
2003 2 2 4 3 3 2 12 4
2004 2 2 2 2 3 1 6 3
2005 2 1 2 2 1 1 5 2
Avg 3 2 4 3 4 2 8 3
*
an
) Change in interest rate for EU12 and UK, change in interest rate differential vis-à-vis EU12 for Sweden 
d Norway. 
 
the 
Source: Datastream and DnB NOR Markets. 
 
 
Why are market movements largest in the Norwegian case? One can only speculate. 
Inflation targeting has a shorter history in Norway than in UK and Sweden, and market 
actors may therefore be less used to the modes of communication applied. Not only may
market actors be less experienced, the same may be the case for the communicators in 
central bank. Secondly, the Norwegian market is smaller and probably also less liquid, 
and may therefore be more volatile. Thirdly, as a smaller, more open and more resource-
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based economy, the monetary policy targets may be more exposed to volatile factors, 
leading to more sudden shifts in the views entertained by the central bank.  
 
Some events worth noticing 
e 
eaker growth globally and domestically in the spring of 2003 that forced 
 
 view on the economic outlook and on the proper policy stance, this has to be 
ommunicated. Two questions then arise: When to communicate the changes? How to 
 economic outlook and on 
the ope , w e b r 2  2003, 
hould mun a a e re c r ted, 
tter. On both of the occasions mentioned above, the combination of weak growth 
 too strong change te led t oo low inflation according to Norges Bank's 
lations. By gnalling wer in est rates, the NOK should weaken, thus increasing 
obability th t the inf ion target was reached "in time". 
answer to th second estion i ess obv us. Is a eech on  given t c on a ven 
 so. 
irst, by disseminating important information in an ordinary speech, the Bank gives 
s a 
 
arket 
eeting can neither  engage in 
We may tentatively conclude that Norges Bank's communication with the market in 
general has been as good as what can reasonably be expected.  However, again with th
benefit of hindsight, a couple of events in later years stand out: 
 
First, Norges Bank's late acknowledgement of the domestic downturn in late 2002, 
leading to an abrupt change of wording from the presentation of the Inflation Report in 
October 2002, to the Governor’s speech on December 3rd, less than five weeks later.  
 
Second, the w
Norges Bank to cut rates in larger steps. Again, the change was not communicated 
following an ordinary Board meeting, but at a speech at the CME-seminar close to five 
weeks later.    
 
As stated above, the overriding consideration must be to do the right thing. 
Considerations regarding communication should not affect this. But, if Norges Bank
changes its
c
communicate them?  
 
On the first question; if Norges Bank changes its view on the
pr r policy r
 be co
esponse
ic
hich wa
 as soon as possible
s the s ca oth in N
. The sooner m
ovembe 002 and 
t price
in May
orthis s m ted rk s a ec
the be
and a  ex  ra o t
calcu  si  lo ter
the pr a lat
 
The e qu s l io sp  a opi gi
day the right outlet for breaking rather dramatic news on the monetary policy stance? We 
do not think
 
F
undue advantage to those who follow all public communication by the central bank. A
matter of openness and transparency, it should be possible to follow the main lines in 
monetary policy, without keeping an eye on the web every time the Governor or Deputy 
Governor gives a speech.  
 
Second, since the subject of the speech is not the change in monetary policy that happens
to be announced, the occasion does not invite to any elaboration of the changes.  
 
hird, providing market-sensitive information at a speech where a number of mT
participants are present is a bit unfair: Those attending the m
immediate trading nor  communicate externally with customers or colleagues, without 
disturbing the meeting as such. 
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One may also raise the issue of the extent external members of the Board are involved 
s. 
or 
 
30  and again to 4% in late June.  
rest 
tion gap, and inflation overshooting the target. Norges Bank's Board 
stated that "If the krone remains strong or appreciates further, it may be appropriate to 
 
tes of GDP growth for Norway's trading partners in 2003 were 
wered by ¼%-point from March to June (but estimates for 2004 were unchanged). 
ts 
 
 large extent, we assume that the Board was involved 
garding the statement on the bank's future course of action. However, there has been no 
ns where the bank actually changes its strategy, the 
oard should be involved. An extraordinary meeting should be held. The decision to 
 
when the administration communicates changes in monetary policy through speeche
The strategy approved by the Board on March 5th 2003 envisaged an end-June interval f
the folio rate of 4¾-5½%. Rates were cut from 6% to 5½% March 5th and to 5% April
th
 
In the March Inflation Report an alternative calculation based upon the forward inte
rate and on the assumption of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) being valid, led to a 
positive produc
reduce the interest rate to the lower range of the interval or below the interval." 
 
As it turned out, interest rates fell more than the market had foreseen (chart 5.7) and the 
NOK depreciated more quickly than the UIP assumption would indicate (chart 5.8). On
the other hand, estima
lo
Inflation turned out 0.2 %-points lower than foreseen. Whether or not these developmen
called for a more aggressive policy, it is clear that the change in policy that materialized 
on June 3rd was not a part of the strategy. 
 
         
Chart 5.7  Chart 5.8 
Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets 
 
 
The strategy for the following period, July – October, was approved by the Board on June 
4th, i.e. after the speech was given (and presumably some time after it was made). Since
the speech tied up the Board to a
re
public statement by the Bank to confirm this assumption. Norges Bank has informed 
NBW that it is the responsibility of the Governor to inform the Board. 
 
NBW's view:  
Viewed more broadly, on occasio
B
take larger steps could have been communicated at a press conference, preceded by
Money market rate, IR0301
0
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8
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a press statement explaining that the former strategy no longer was valid, with t
reasons for this change being given.  
 
he 
 a 
 as a source of information on  how Norges 
ank perceives the working of the economy, and how the Bank may respond to future 
pments. A large number of special analyses (on average 4 per Report) are 
particularly valuable.  
 after 
the quarterly national accounts, fo
a good argument, Norges Bank has responde
requires a lot of resources, making it worthw
researched reports. We find th
 
Interest and exchange rate assumptions 
A central aspect of the communication process 
for interest rates and the exchange rate
issue, and both advised that Norges Bank s
the form of a projected “optimal” path fo
 
st six years, Norges Bank has ba casts for two central variables, 
ge rate ed 
xchange rate, I44), on a large number of varying assumptions, cf. table below. 
 
The Inflation Report 
Norges Bank publishes its Inflation Report three times per year. This Report is the 
cornerstone for Norges Bank’s communication with the market. The Report has come
long way since first being published in fourth quarter of 1994, then as a 26-page 
supplement to Norges Bank’s quarterly Penger og Kreditt. 
 
The Inflation Report has steadily improved
B
develo
 
NBW-04 argued that the Inflation reports should be published quarterly, some time
r the reports to be as updated as possible. While this is 
d that producing the Inflation Report 
hile to publish fewer and more thoroughly 
is explanation understandable.  
is what assumptions to base the forecasts 
 on. Both NBW-03 and NBW-04 addressed this 
hould release an explicit policy inclination in 
r interest rates. We share this view. 
Over the la sed its fore
namely the folio rate and the exchan  (EURNOK, later the import-weight
e
 
Table 5.3   Technical assumptions for folio rate and import-weighted exchange rate 
IR Money market rate EURNOK 
1/99 Unchanged for ½ year, then forward rates Back to initial range in 6 months  
2/99 - " - 8.30: Approximately average last three 
months 
3/99 Forward rates 8.30: Approximately average last month 
4/99 - " -  8.25: Average last two months 
 I44  
1/00 Forward rates Average 1/1-17/3 
2/00 - " -  Average 1/1-30/4 
3/00 - " - Average 1/1-21/9 
4/00 - " -  Average last three months 
1/01 - " - Average 1/1-1/3 
2/01 Unchanged 8 quarters, then towards forward r.  Average last three months 
 Folio rate  
3/01 Unchanged (7%) Average last three months 
1/02 Unchanged (6.5%) Average last month 
2/02 Unchanged (6.5%) 
3/02 Unchanged (7%) 
Average last three months 
Average last three months 
1/03 Unchanged (5.5%) Average last month 
2/03 Unchanged (4%) Average 3/6-19/6 
2/03A Forward rate Forward rate 
3/03 Forward rate Forward rate 
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1/04 Forward rates (-¼%) Forward rate 
2/04 Forward rates (-¼%) Forward rate 
/04 Forward rates (credit-risk adjusted, -¼%) Forward rate 3
1/05 Forward rate, adjusted after 2006 Forward rate 
 
This varying practice was confusing and made monetary policy less transparent. As 
previously argued, such lack of transparency could possibly create more market volatility.  
nk’s forecasts are still conditioned on interest 
 to affect the 
, when 
d inflat s that 
a her 
informing the market that it should not expect rates to be hiked earlier in Norway than 
h ly Inflation Report of 2004, forecasts based upon forward rates 
ie t inflation did not reach its 2½% targ ee-year 
o nk then stated that “Monetary policy should be aimed at increasing 
tio what faster pace than project n Report. The most 
p  alternative now seems to be that the interest rate should be kept unchanged 
 lo  period than indicated by market exp gave a signal not 
a hen this 
i n with the forward 
.
t  in March this year, in IR 1/05, where Norges Bank based its 
a rket forward rates for the first two years (until end-2006), then on a 
a justed faster towards the f 5½% than what market 
that the Bank (implicitly) with market prices for the 
006, one is very close to applying a preferred – or "optimal" – rate 
 
ar  interest rate path is that preparing and 
s th may claim resources both at the staff and Board 
 
Since IR 2/03 Norges Bank has made forecasts based upon the market’s  forward prices 
for interest rates and the exchange rate. This is clearly preferable to forecasts conditioned 
upon unchanged interest and exchange rates. Note that the Swedish Riksbank in 2005 
abandoned its practice of unchanged rates in favour of using forward rates, like Norges 
Bank and the Bank of England. 
 
One problem remains, however: Norges Ba
rate assumptions that may deviate from what the Bank considers the optimal one. 
Therefore, the forecasts are not best guesses. The bank's forecasts for private 
consumption, housing prices and CPI inflation may be “intentionally wrong”, and more 
so if the optimal paths of interest rates and exchange rates deviate significantly from the 
espective forward rates. This is unfortunate given that Norges Bank is tryingr
whole forward rate curve. The alternative of publishing an optimal interest rate path, 
should be considered. 
 
orges Bank, we are pleased to note, is moving in this direction. In March 2004N
the folio rate was cut to 1.75%, the Bank informed the market that the alternative under 
sid olio rate at 2.0% and keep it at that level for a longer con eration was to maintain the f
perio . In May, the Bank added that “The 
ll not be the frontrunner when ot
ion outlook in Norway implie
Norw y wi countries increase interest rates”, 
elsew ere. In the Ju
impl d tha et before the end of the thr
horiz n. Norges Ba
a someinfla n at ed in the Inflatio
appro riate
for a nger ectations.” Again, this 
only bout the near-term rates, but also about a likely level for forward rates. W
se was repeated in November, Norges Baexerc nk expressed satisfactio
curve  
 
A fur her step was taken
forec sts upon the ma
rate p th where rates ad  "normal" level o
prices 
d
implied. Given seems satisfied 
perio  up to end-2
path.
 
One gument against applying an optimal
discu sing a detailed interest rate pa
level that may be put to better use. However, one should remember that a proper 
discussion of the future interest rate path is a necessary component of any interest rate 
decision, so it is not clear how many additional resources are really required. 
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A second argument against applying an optimal interest rate path is that it may take some
time before the market and, probably to a greater degree, the public, learn to accept that a 
published optimal interest path will not represent an obligation to set rates accordingly.
On the other hand, we have learned to live with signals of unchanged interest rates that 
were abandoned soon after.  
 
 
 parity 
 not market 
en the inflation target is met.) 
1. 
, 
 
and welcome initiative in 2004 is the series Staff Memos. These memos “are 
tended to encourage comments from colleagues and other interested parties”. They 
. It 
ar, jointly with economists from Norges Bank, where monetary policy in general 
nd the Norwegian approach in particular, is on the agenda. This initiative is in line with 
eches 
k 
ic debates with fellow researchers outside the Bank. 
 
Given the great uncertainty attached to estimates of future exchange rates, the best 
assumption is probably to continue using the assumption of uncovered interest rate
as the bank does today, but conditioned upon the optimal interest rate path and
rates. In IR 1/05 one sticks to the forward exchange rate, despite not fully using the 
forward interest rate. This obviously is inconsistent, but unlikely to make much of a 
difference for the calculations undertaken for the Report. (By indicating higher interest 
rates than the market expects, the exchange rate should be slightly stronger, thus 
postponing the time wh
 
Both to test the robustness of the strategy and to deepen the public and the market’s 
understanding of how the transmission mechanism works, it is worthwhile presenting 
calculations based upon alternative assumptions. One such could be unchanged interest 
and exchange rates. Other good examples are the five alternatives presented in the 
monetary policy assessments (strategy) in Chapter 5 in the Inflation Report 2005/
 
 
5.3 Communication – the receiving end of it 
 
Norges Bank has done an impressive job in terms of making available data on prices
interest rates, exchange rates, etc. as far back as to 1819, providing economic historians 
with unique time series for further scrutiny, see Eitrheim, Klovland and Qvigstad (2004).
A consumer price index as far back as to 1516 is also provided in this publication. 
  
A new 
in
offer a useful channel for scientific discourse with fellow economists outside the Bank
is important for researchers in the Bank to have an outlet for research-based policy 
analyses that do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank. 
  
Once a year the Bank invites leading academics to participate in a one- or two-days 
semin
a
what was suggested by NBW-02.  
 
Norges Bank is quite active in educating the public through presentations and spe
given by the Governor and the Deputy Governor. Also, by occasionally writing feature 
articles in leading newspapers the Bank reaches out to a wider audience.   
 
 
NBW’s view: 
Norges Bank has taken an active approach in communicating with the academic 
community and with the public at large. It is important that researchers in the Ban
are free to engage in scientif
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Norges Bank receives very good marks on its communication with the organization
the labour market. The Governor is good at explaining the Bank’s policy and also at 
listening to arguments advanced by the organizations. Speeches given by the Governor 
and the Deputy Governor across the country at fairly short intervals are valued 
contributions to Norges Bank’s explanation of its objectives and plans. Labour marke
organizations now have a clear conception of Norges Bank now putting more emphasis 
on variables other than the expected rate of inflation two years down the road.  
 
s in 
t 
ikewise, the politicians are very pleased with the performance of Norges Bank The 
od. 
ers of 
 gave 
ood answers to the question posed. 
 of employees’ federation, as 
ell as politicians and the public at large are all clear that Norges Bank now practices 
 
ued 
at an inflation rate of about 2 % would be necessary to keep the exchange rate stable, 
s 
variant. In his annual 
dress in 2002 the Governor stated that people could “take as a given” a rate on inflation 
 communication problem of a special nature arises, namely one in which the Bank is 
g 
 maintains that 
e policy is the same, private agents may be uncertain how the new formulations should 
e interpreted. This may reduce transparency and predictability of the monetary policy.  
xpectations of the politicians. When policy formulations are changed significantly, 
L
economic development in Norway over the last year and a half has generally been go
Monetary policy has contributed in a positive manner, although the current rate of 
inflation is far off the mark. At the two hearings in the Storting the Governor of Norges 
Bank did a fine job in explaining his monetary policy stance and in educating memb
the Finance Committee on the intricacies of the conduct of monetary policy. He also
g
 
Agents in financial markets, leaders of labour unions and
w
inflation targeting more flexibly than in the early stages. Extending the horizon for 
reaching the inflation target is one indication of increased flexibility. More focus on 
keeping the krone exchange rate at a suitable level is another. Some observers go so far as
to suggest that l’ancien regime is back. Whereas Norges Bank in 1999 and 2000 arg
th
the perception now is that Norges Bank focuses on a stable exchange rate to keep 
inflation on track. Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. 
 
Norges Bank, however, maintains that its behaviour has not changed over time. In it
view, its practice of flexible inflation targeting has remained in
ad
of 2.5 %. On the same occasion three years later he was more flexible arguing that 
Norway should “accept somewhat wider variations in inflation than some other 
countries.” Such changes are noticed by the outside world. 
 
A
unwilling to acknowledge how its messages are received by the outside world. Admittin
that there is room for changes and improvements may increase the credibility of the 
Bank. When policy formulations are changed significantly, while the Bank
th
b
 
NBW’s view:  
Norges Bank is doing a good job in communicating the objectives and plans of 
monetary policy with the social partners. The hearings in the Storting meet the 
e
while the Bank maintains that the policy is the same, private agents may be 
uncertain how the new formulations should be interpreted. 
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6 Sammendrag av Norges Bank Watch 2005 
 
 
Vårt hovedsyn er at pengepolitikken nå fungerer godt. De betydelige rentekuttene siden 
desember 2002, og et lavt rentenivå etter dette, fremstår som en egnet politikk. Norges 
Banks politikkanalyser dokumenterer stor faglig kompetanse i Banken. 
Kommunikasjonen med markedet er gjennomgående god. Et meget positivt hovedbilde 
forhindrer ikke at det på noen områder er rom for forbedringer. Naturlig nok vil slike 
forhold få stor plass i en rapport som denne. Hovedbildet om en god norsk pengepolitikk, 
 
ly in 
 
s 
, og har derfor anledning til å instruere Norges Bank ved Kongelig 
ative 
r å 
Dagen før et rentemøte i Norges Banks hovedstyre legger sentralbanksjefen frem for 
Finansdepartementet sine vurderinger og eventuelle forslag til beslutning. Denne 
prosedyren fratar ikke hovedstyret det fulle ansvar for den beslutningen som treffes.  
 
Et gjennomgående tema i norsk pengepolitisk debatt har vært i hvilken grad Norges Bank 
har tatt hensyn til valutakursen, og hva mandatet for pengepolitikken sier om dette. Etter 
vårt skjønn synes Norges Bank i noen sammenhenger å tolke mandatet på en snever måte, 
ved å nedtone henvisningen til at pengepolitikken også skal bidra til 
valutakursstabilisering. Vi mener at det nåværende mandatet er tilfredsstillende. I noen 
står imidlertid fast. 
 
Mandatet til Norges Bank Watch 2005 lyder slik: 
 
The objective of the Norges Bank Watch Report of 2005 is to evaluate Norges 
Bank's conduct of monetary policy, given the mandate for the monetary policy set 
by the Government in March 2001. The committee should evaluate if the 
objectives stated in the monetary policy mandate concur with those expressed by
Norges Bank and whether Norges Bank uses its policy instruments efficient
order to achieve the relevant objectives.  
 
The committee should also address other issues that it may find relevant for the
present conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Finally, the committee should evaluate the communication strategy of Norge
Bank.  
 
The Report shall be presented at a press conference no later than 1 June 2005.  
 
 
 
Norges Banks tolkning av sitt mandat 
 
egjeringen har det konstitusjonelle ansvaret for den økonomiske politikken, herunder R
pengepolitikken
resolusjon. Om regjeringen fant det nødvendig å instruere Norges Bank om den oper
utøvelsen av pengepolitikken, ville sentralbanksjefen trolig måtte gå av. Terskelen fo
bruke instruksjonsretten er derfor høy. Slik bør det også være. Samtidig er 
instruksjonsretten hensiktsmessig å ha om en helt uforutsett situasjon skulle kreve rask 
handling. 
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situasjoner vil en henvisning til valutakursstabilitet i mandatet kunne påvirke 
r lutakursstabilitet. 
n enter som Norges 
anks inflasjonsrapport, og ikke utelate henvisningen til valutakursstabilitet. 
 
hoveds  
siden h
også fo
Banken
 
 
Pengepolitikken i 2001-2005 
 
Pengep p. Den økonomiske utviklingen i 2004 og 
2005 kan derfor kaste nytt lys over pengepolitikken i 2001-2003. Både i 2003 og 2004 
var infl ivt. 
Vurdert i ettertid var følgelig pengepolitikken for stram i 2001-2003. Når Norges Bank 
først erkjente at politikken var for stram, var imidlertid Banken rask med å reagere. De 
betydel  
tuasjonen. 
entesettingen må imidlertid også ses i forhold til lønnsfastsettelsen. Ved å heve renten 
anken konsekvensene av for høy 
ed noe større slakk i 
 
nde 
 
ma kedsaktørenes valutakursforventninger, og dermed bidra til va
a datet for pengepolitikken bør gjengis i sin helhet i politikkdokumM
B
 
Den meget lave inflasjonen nå reiser spørsmål om hva som egentlig bør være målet for 
pengepolitikken. Dersom pengepolitikken skulle måles direkte ut fra den vanlige 
målsettingen om inflasjon nær 2,5 prosent, og stabil produksjon, ville det store avviket 
for inflasjonen kunne tyde på at pengepolitikken var mislykket. Likevel er de aller fleste
observatører godt fornøyde. Den lave inflasjonen blir ikke betraktet som noe problem, så 
lenge realøkonomien fungerer godt. Dette tyder på at de vanlige pengepolitiske 
ålsettinger er for snevre. m
 
Norges Banks politikkdokumenter viser høy kompetanse. Banken følger 
trømmene når det gjelder tenkningen om pengepolitikk ved inflasjonsmål. Men
ovedstrømmene er noe snevre metodologisk, er det viktig at Norges Bank er åpen 
r andre deler av økonomisk teori, og andre tilnærminger til pengepolitikk. 
s bruk av det regionale nettverket er et eksempel på slik åpenhet. 
olitikken virker med langt tidsettersle
asjonen langt under målet på 2,5 prosent. Samtidig var produksjonsgapet negat
ige rentekuttene siden desember 2002 fremstår i ettertid som en riktig reaksjon på
si
 
R
etter lønnsoppgjøret våren 2002, tydeliggjorde B
nnsvekst under et inflasjonsmål. Denne rentehevningen, sammen mlø
arbeidsmarkedet, bidro til lønnsmoderasjonen de to påfølgende årene.  
 
Hvor gode rentebeslutningene tatt i 2004 og så langt i 2005 har vært, gjenstår å se. Den 
siste runden med rentekutt ble tatt etter at oppsvinget i norsk økonomi var kommet godt i 
gang. Lavere rente var derfor ikke nødvendig av realøkonomiske hensyn. Samtidig 
fortsatte inflasjonen å overraske på nedsiden, og hensynet til inflasjonsmålet tilsa derfor
en svært lav rente.   
 
I juli 2004 ble toårshorisonten forlatt til fordel for en mer fleksibel horisont på 1-3 år. 
Uten en slik endring ville den lave inflasjonen kreve ytterligere rentekutt, med tilhøre
fare for ustabilitet i realøkonomien. Beslutningen om å strekke horisonten var således 
rnuftig. fo
 
Dagens pengepolitikk er ekspansiv. Realrenten er 1½-2½ prosentenheter under sitt antatte 
nøytrale nivå. Ekspansiv pengepolitikk er riktig når inflasjonen er så lav som den er nå. 
Men den realøkonomiske utvikling er god, og produksjonsgapet er nær null. Derfor må 
pengepolitikken også legge vekt på å unngå for kraftig stimulans av økonomien. Dersom
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veksten blir for sterk, vil det innebære en betydelig risiko for en ny runde der h
fører til appresiering av kronen og kostnadsproblemer for næringslivet. Det er derfor
betryggende at Norges Banks hovedstyre nå signaliserer at renten gradvis vil bli hevet til
mer normale nivåer i løpet av fireårsperioden.  
øy rente 
 
 
r med i 
r hvert publisere dem forut for selve strategiperioden, har 
edret kommunikasjonen ytterligere. 
e 
rasker 
sonen, 
torbritannia og Sverige. Markedsutslagene representerer etter vårt skjønn likevel ikke 
oe stort problem. 
orges Banks to viktigste endringer i pengepolitikken de tre siste årene ble kunngjort i 
 
er 
es 
nken har gitt seg selv lengre tid før inflasjonsmålet skal være innfridd. En 
nnen indikasjon er den sterkere fokusering Banken nå har på hva som er en passende 
, 
 
 
Kommunikasjon 
 
Norges Bank gjør en stadig bedre jobb med å informere markedsaktørene og publikum 
for øvrig om innretningen av pengepolitikken. Særlig inneholder Inflasjonsrapporten 
mange innsiktsfulle analyser. Beslutningen om å ta hovedstyrets strategirapporte
Inflasjonsrapporten, og ette
b
 
Dersom kommunikasjonen er god og pengepolitikken er forutsigbar, vil markedsaktøren
normalt kunne forutse de faktiske rentebeslutningene. Dersom læring finner sted, bør 
markedsutslagene bli mindre over tid. Et slikt mønster ses ikke. Norges Bank over
fortsatt markedet. Renteutslagene er gjennomgående noe større enn i Euro
S
n
 
N
foredrag og ikke etter ordinære rentemøter. Når Norges Bank gjør slike større skift, kan
det diskuteres om dette bør kunngjøres på annen måte, f.eks. ved pressemeldinger og/ell
pressekonferanser. I tillegg er det naturlig at Hovedstyret involveres i beslutningen. 
 
Aktørene i finansmarkedene, politikere og arbeidslivets parter er samstemte om at Norg
Bank nå praktiserer inflasjonsstyring mer fleksibelt enn tidligere. Et konkret uttrykk for 
dette er at Ba
a
valutakurs. Norges Bank på sin side er imidlertid av den oppfatning at dens atferd ikke 
har endret seg over tid; inflasjonsstyringen har hele tiden blitt praktisert på samme
fleksible vis. Bankens oppfatning av egen virksomhet på dette punktet samstemmer 
således ikke med omverdenens. 
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